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ProfessorSimon argues that a theory of raciallyprejudicedmotivation can explain currentracial equal protection law. He describes the values that would serve as the normative basis of such
a theory and explains how the theory would operate. Simon sees
many historically troublesome equal protection issues as involving difficulties in the evidentiary system through which
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most currently vexing problems in racial equal protection
law-the constitutionalityof so-called benign classificationsand
of actions that disproportionately disadvantage racial
groups-turn upon the same question: Would the challenged action have been taken butfor racialprejudice?
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INTRODUCTION

Should the question why a governmental body took an action
be relevant to that action's constitutionality? The question of why
an action was taken is, in one sense, necessarily implicit in any
system of constitutional adjudication that requires the government to justify challenged actions. As it has developed over the
past few decades, our system of adjudicating constitutional rights,
under several important constitutional provisions, imposes upon
the government a differentiated justification requirement. Sometimes the plaintiff's claim will be defeated by the government's
showing that the challenged action is rationally related to some
conceivable and legitimate legislative goal (the traditional rational relationship test). Sometimes the plaintiff will be successful unless the government establishes that the action was
necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest (the newer
strict scrutiny test). At still other times, the government must satisfy some as yet not clearly defined intermediate burden of justification (sometimes called rational basis with a bite). Perhaps,
then, the appropriate question to ask is what function this differentiated justification system performs.
Different governmental actions produce different effects. On
the one hand, our differentiated justification requirement may
function to ensure that a challenged action's "good" effects compensate for its constitutionally "bad" effects. Perhaps the
Supreme Court's understanding is that the Constitution disfavors
in varying degrees a spectrum of potential consequences of governmental actions. Under this view, the relative badness of an ef1042
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fect, determined according to the Court's sense of the priority of
constitutional values, determines the government's justification
burden. An action producing a "very bad" effect is unconstitutional unless compensated for by an extremely good effect, a
calculus presumably manifested by the "compelling state interest" formula. However, an action producing a slightly "bad" effect
need only be shown to be rational, and so on.
On the other hand, perhaps the differentiated justification requirement, in some or in all the cases in which it is applied, functions as an evidentiary system through which the Court assesses
the probable truthfulness of the government's explanation of its
action. Perhaps, in other words, the Court understands the Constitution to prohibit actions only when they were probably taken
because constitutionally disfavored considerations or values influenced the decisionmaking process. On this view, whenever the
challenged action is one that culminated in enactment or promulgation of a rule, one would expect the rule itself at times to be extremely probative of the considerations that affected its
enactment or promulgation. Similarly, one would expect that the
effects produced by the action would at times be probative on the
"illicit motivation" issue. Perhaps, then, the differentiated justification requirement functions to test the credibility of governmental denials that constitutionally disfavored considerations affected
the decisionmaking process that culminated in different kinds of
challenged actions. Thus, the variation in burdens of justification
is simply a reflection of the differing degrees to which rules and

effects are themselves probative of illicit motivation.
This article attempts to articulate and to explain the operation
of just such a motivation theory of constitutional law in cases involving racially based equal protection claims. The article offers a
theory under which a finding that a governmental action was
causally affected by racial prejudice can be understood as both a
sufficient and a necessary condition for holding the action unconstitutional. Thus, the two most pressing issues in racial equal
protection law, the constitutionality of so-called benign classifications and of actions that disproportionately disadvantage racial
groups, can be understood as turning on the same question:
Would the challenged action have been taken but for racial
prejudice?' The answer to this question is to a great extent de1. Although I view the prohibition against prejudiced governmental action as
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pendent upon the facts of particular cases.

Although motivation analysis has been a major and recurring
the normative heart and therefore by far the central protection of the equal protection clause, it can be argued that the clause should be read to include other
norms as well and thus to warrant heightened judicial scrutiny of some types of
governmental action that are not prejudicially motivated. If justified at all, however, such extensions of the clause must be taken with great care, for this is an
area where high-priority principles often conflict.
The two main lines of argument for interpreting the equal protection clause to
condemn governmental actions even when not prejudicially motivated come from
quite different if not contradictory normative intuitions. One position would have
the courts strike down at least some racially neutral actions that disproportionately disadvantage some racial groups unless the government establishes some
special justification for the action. See Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977);
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pmi. & Pun. AFF. 107 (1976);
Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U. PA. L.
REv. 540 (1977). The other position would have the courts enforce a regime of "col"orblindness" upon government, disfavoring racially benign actions to the same (or
almost the same) extent as racially prejudiced ones. See Greenawalt, Judicial
Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preferencesin Law School Admissions, 75 CoLUm. L
Rav. 559 (1975); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionalityof Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities,1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1. Disproportionate impact theories generally appeal to the principle that blacks and other similarly situated
groups have a special entitlement to compensation for, or protection against, the
continuing effects of past injustice. Colorblindness theories appeal to the principle
that race-conscious governmental actions are at least a long-run evil.
Both these principles have moral force, and the difficulty with many arguments
which might be premised on either principle is that they conflict with the remaining principle and often with other principles and policies as well. Thus, as Professor Ely has noted, disproportionate impact theories in effect tend to promote raceconscious decisionmaking, Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1255-61 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Motivation], because an action would be presumptively unconstitutional if it in
fact disproportionately disadvantaged blacks. Correspondingly, colorblindness theories tend to block compensatory programs for blacks because under them an action taken for racial reasons would be at least presumptively unconstitutional.
Moreover, many arguments premised on either principle also collide with important institutional values. Thus, a broad, rigorous compensatory justice theory of
constitutional rights would result in the imposition of costs on groups of whites
bearing no moral responsibility for the past injustices to blacks; whereas in general, our philosophy of adjudication cautions judges against transferring welfare to
those who have been injured from others bearing no moral responsibility for the
injury. Similarly, a broad or rigorous constitutional rule of colorblindness at least
implicitly would involve judges in second-guessing political judgments on the basis of what are often complex issues of social fact-for example, whether the presence or the absence of compensatory programs for blacks is more likely to benefit
blacks in the long run or is more likely to lead to racial politics or social divisiveness.
These moral and institutional ambiguities caution against major, intrusive extensions of the clause beyond its ban on prejudiced action. To the extent that disproportionate impact alone should lead to a judgment of unconstitutionality in the
absence of prejudiced motivation, the most acceptable theory could be one like
Professor Eisenberg's. See Eisenberg, supra. His theory would require proof of a
causal nexus between a current condition of disproportionate disadvantage and
prior 'race-dependent" (or in my terms, racially prejudiced) action. Id., at 64-68.
Correspondingly, if governmental actions motivated by racially benign considerations deserve any additional constitutional screening, the justification burden
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2
theme in constitutional law almost from its beginnings, few of its
persistent mysteries were even passably understood until the relatively recent work of Professors John Ely and Paul Brest.3 Thus,
creating the opportunity to take a position was not the main reason for the writing of this article. Rather, Ely's and Brest's insights, combined with the probably related changes in thinking
4
now being manifested by Supreme Court opinions in this area,
seemed to make the time right for a more detailed look at the theoretical basis of motivation analysis and at how an analytical approach founded openly on a quest for illicit motives might
actually operate. This attempt would not have been possible without Ely's and Brest's contributions, and if an occasional citation is
missing or this fact is not otherwise obvious, I wish to state
clearly how heavily in debt I am to their writings.

Unquestionably, this article falls short of its original goals. Most
obviously, it expressly deals only with racial discrimination, although its theory seems potentially useful in understanding many
other constitutional problem areas. Even more unfortunately, the
article plainly gives inadequate attention to some components of
the theory and problems in specifying its application. For example, its implications for the range of state action related problems
are merely sketched out, as is its application to some particularly
troublesome benign classification problems like tipping point
quotas. Racial discrimination is an onion-like subject, with a new
layer of mystery appearing as each preceding one is peeled away,
should be considerably less than that demanded by the necessary to a compelling
interest standard.
2. Undoubtedly, the best-known early suggestion that legislative motivation
may be constitutionally relevant is Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's "pretext" passage
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819). The best-known early
contrary suggestion is the Court's discussion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810).
3. Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiseriminationPrinciple,90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.
REv. 95 [hereinafter cited as An Approach]; Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Cf. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585
(1975) (assumes constitutional obligations will prevail over political interests);
Ely, The ConstitutionalityofReverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CH. L. REV. 723
(1974) (nothing suspicious about a majority's discriminating against itself).
4. Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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and in the end limitations of space, time, and comprehension simply loomed too large.
The article is roughly divided into two parts. The first part explains the normative theory that makes or ought to make the
question of racially prejudiced motivation outcome determinative.
It is, on the whole, rather abstract. The second part explains the
evidentiary system within which the question of racially
prejudiced motivation is or ought to be adjudicated. It is rather
concrete, dealing first with overt racial prejudice and thereafter
with covert discrimination.
The entire thesis is rooted in a vision of the equal protection
clause as designed to remove racial prejudice from governmental
decisionmaking processes. Although over the years numerous
Supreme Court decisions have reflected this vision, it has never
been more obvious than in Strauder v. West Virginia,5 when the
Court, sitting a decade after the passage of the fourteenth amendment, repeatedly emphasized that the point of the amendment
was protecting blacks against governmental action based on "positive dislike,"6 'unfriendly action," 7 "an assertion of their inferiority,"8 and "prejudice" 9: 'The framers of the constitutional
amendment must have known full well the existence of such
prejudice and its likelihood to continue against the manumitted
knowledge was doubtless a motive
slaves and their race, and that
0
that led to the amendment."
THE NORMATIVE THEORY: RACIALLY PREJUDICED

GovERNMENTAL ACTIONS
The point of the equal protection clause has never been more
succinctly or better stated than it was in Strauder. The clause
prohibits racially prejudiced governmental actions," a concept
which is coextensive with racial discrimination. The former expression covers neither more nor less than does the latter. The
judgment whether a governmental action is racially prejudiced requires an inquiry into the motivation or attitudes that led to the
action. This requirement does not mean that a court should hold
governmental action unconstitutional on the basis of the motiva5. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
6. Id. at 306.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 308.
9. Id. at 308, 309.
10. Id. at 309.
11. This article's theory of racial discrimination is closely related to Professor
Brest's theory of "race-dependent" decisions; my thoughts on the subject have
been greatly aided by his work. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
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tion behind it without regard to whether harmful consequences
result. Rather, it means that a court's finding that governmental
action was taken because of racially prejudiced attitudes amounts
to a finding that the government has insulted or offended the dignity of group members against whom the prejudice was directed.
Moreover, racially prejudiced governmental actions may and
often do cause other harms. However, even if a court finds that
racial prejudice did play some role in the challenged governmental action, a court would not necessarily be warranted in finding
that this prejudice caused other harms about which a plaintiff is
complaining. For this reason, the remedy to which a plaintiff is
entitled depends on whether the prejudice is causally connected
to these other harms. To understand this sequence of propositions, we must begin by discussing the nature of racial prejudice.
Thereafter, we turn to a normative account of the reasons why racially prejudiced governmental actions are constitutionally evil
and then to a consideration of the remedial (and hence "causal")
implications of this normative account. Finally, we give some relatively brief attention to the relationship between racially
prejudiced attitudes and goals and the kinds of governmental decisions and the sources of prejudiced attitudes encompassed by
the theory.
The Nature of Racial Prejudice
Racial (or ethnic) prejudice is an attitude or emotion composed
of two essential characteristics: The group against which
prejudice is directed is regarded negatively, and this negative attitude is categorical-that is, it is directed against anyone who is a
member of the group simply because of his membership.' 2 A person who is prejudiced has negative feelings about an individual
12. The literature on prejudice is voluminous. The two major works on the psychology of prejudice probably are G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954),
and T. ADORNO, E. FRENKAL-BRJNSWIK, D. LsvnsoN, &R. SANFORD, THE AUTHoRiTARIAN PERSONALrrY (1969). Obviously, different authors have used different
words to define prejudice, but it seems very unlikely that the limited claims made
in the text of this article on the nature of prejudice would be regarded as controversial by scholars in the field. For quick reference, the interested reader might
consult the summary of definitions of prejudice of 15 major works provided in H.
Eunuci, THE SOCIL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 3-4 (1973). Some other works of
general interest on the subject include E. GoFFmAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON T=E M AGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963); J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM (1972); J.
KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHIsTORY (1971); P. WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND
RACE (1973).
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who is a member of a disfavored group, notwithstanding the fact
that she may never have met the individual and, indeed, may
never have met or may have had little personal experience with
other members of the group. She brings to any encounter a diffuse disrespect or dislike that either precludes or biases the sort
of individuated evaluation she would make of one against whom
she is not prejudiced.13 If her prejudice is "dominative," her behavior may manifest some sort of aggressiveness; or if, as is probably more common today, her feelings are "aversive," she may
seek to avoid members of the group. 14 Prejudice may fulfill some
psychic or irrational need for an individual, or it may simply result from acceptance of custom or folkways which themselves
may serve various social functions. Prejudice may also be reflected in a variety of behaviors and be subjectively experienced
in a variety of ways.
A prejudiced person has both a disrespectful or disliking attitude toward the disfavored group and a set of accompanying factual beliefs (often called a stereotype), and it is important to
distinguish between the attitude and its attendant beliefs. Thus,
someone who is prejudiced against Jews or blacks will generally
hold beliefs about these groups-for example, that Jews are clannish or socially pushy and that blacks are slovenly or dangerous.
Such beliefs operate in two ways on the prejudiced person: They
serve as self-justifications for his negative attitude, and they distort his perceptions and evaluations of individuals belonging to
the disfavored group.' 5 However, factual beliefs do not fully account for the prejudiced person's attitude. Often, as in the examples suggested, a prejudiced person holds several beliefs that are
basically inconsistent. Both common experience and psychological research indicate that confronting a prejudiced person with
evidence that contradicts his faulty beliefs will not necessarily alter his attitude. He may simply refuse to accept the evidence no
matter how persuasive it is, he may switch to some other justifying but equally unsupported factual belief, or he may accept the
refutation about an individual whose qualities are at issue but not
change his belief about the group in general. 16
13. See, e.g., E. GoFFmAN, supra note 12, at 9. For general discussions of prejudice, see G. ALLPORT, supra note 12, ch. 1; J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RAcisM 24, ch.
4 (1972); THE AtorraOARIAN PERSONALrrY, supra note 12, at 1-150.
14. J. KovEL, W~rrE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 31-34, 51-92 (1971). See also THE
AumoRrrAmiAN PERSONALrrY, supra note 12, at 60.
15. G. ALLPORT, supra note 12, at 13, 23-24, 191-92; L EHRUCH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 21 (1973); E. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 9; THE AUTHoPrrAa_4N PERSONALITY, supra note 12, at 41, 46, 58, 62, 74-76, 92-94.

16. See authorities cited note 15 supra.
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Thus the disrespectful or disliking attitude of prejudice is not
defined by or equivalent to the factual beliefs that it includes.
Prejudiced people hold the attitude as a value, and therefore, as
we all do with our values, they search for and believe in empirical
bases for it, and it, in turn, affects their perceptions of facts and
ordering of reality. Because racial prejudice is an important
value-attitude that is often widely shared within a society, some
observers have persuasively suggested that it has the characteristics of an ideology. If so, it is an ideology that the equal protection
clause seeks to remove from governmental processes.' 7
Why Racially PrejudicedGovernmental Actions
are ConstitutionallyEvil
Perhaps a normative account of the reasons why racially prejudiced governmental action is evil might rest simply on the claim
that it is widely regarded as such in our society or that it violates
the cardinal rule of fairness-the Golden Rule--or Kant's categorical imperative.' 8 However, more can be said on this score. Because racial prejudice is marked by several relatively unusual
characteristics, the normal functioning of democratic processes
cannot adequately protect groups against which prejudice is directed.
Most of us probably believe that a governmental entity should
not treat some people differently from others simply because
many of its constituents dislike people of that sort or regard them
as less worthy, and several constitutional norms in one way or another seem to reflect this judgment. However, at the same time,
we may believe that governmental actions based partly on dislike
for certain kinds of people are to some extent inevitable.
Racial prejudice, however, has qualities that cumulatively make
it considerably more troublesome than most kinds of disrespectful or disliking attitudes. Perhaps because race plays an important role in the self-identification of individuals, racial dislikes
seem more deeply rooted than do most others, almost as if they
were some inextinguishable vestige of primordial man's instinctive dislike of clans or tribes outside his own.19 Furthermore, they
appear to have a close nexus to action-so much so that some stu17. G. ALLPORT, supra note 12, at 27; THE AuTHOmrruAN PERsONA=rrY, supra
note 12, at 58, 74, 92.
18. L KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS Or MORALS (L. Beck trans. 1959).
19. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, supra note 12, at 107-10.

1049

dents of prejudice have metaphorically described the attitude as
one with a purpose or implying a readiness for action.2 0 Moreover,
racially prejudiced attitudes, to the extent that they are not acted
out, are peculiarly likely to be kept hidden, both from others and
from oneself, thus making them less vulnerable to change and
more inclined to fester.2 1 Finally, racially prejudiced attitudes,
though of varying sorts and intensities, seem to be quite widespread, unlike many other dislikes that tend to differ according to
an individual's tastes.22
These characteristics at least begin to signal racial prejudice as
a special case of disrespect or dislike posing a potentially serious
threat to the operation of democratic government. We cannot extend to this attitude whatever understanding we may have about
the "legitimacy" of the government manifesting its dislikes in law,
for this attitude is so deeply rooted, pervasive, action-ready, and
insidious as to make it uniquely dangerous to groups against
which it is directed.
Moreover, racial groups are different from others that may be
the object of governmental dislike in ways that greatly aggravate
the danger of unchecked majoritarian rule. For instance, racial
groups historically have been "discrete and insular" minorities.
Here discrete has a dual connotation. First, members of the group
are relatively easy to identify as compared with others against
whom majoritarian governments might be tempted to act out
their dislikes-for example, the lazy, the ugly, the stupid, and the
arrogant. Second, a racial minority is a discrete group in the sense
that a dislike directed toward it does not necessarily extend to or
threaten any other group, and for this reason relatively few common interests exist between the disliked and other groups. This
discreteness, together with the pervasiveness and depth of racial
prejudice, has historically made such groups insular in the sense
that they have been excluded from the interest-group coalition
system that drives the legislative process. 23
20. Of course, the likelihood that individuals will act out their racial prejudices
varies among individuals and is dependent on the extent to which the culture promotes or condones racism. See J. KOVEL, WrrE RACISM: A PSYcHOHISTORY 31-34,
51-92 (1971).
21. Hiding the attitude from oneself is, of course, a major function performed by
stereotyping. See authorities cited note 15 supra.
22. G. ALLPORT, supra note 12, at 74-79; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMSSION ON
CIviL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADViSORY CONMUSSION ON Crvm DisoRDERS pt II (1968). A recent study of antisemitism indicates that prejudice is both
widespread and persistent C. GLOCK, R. WuTNow, J. PiAvio, & M. SPENCER, AnOLESCENT PREJUDICE 6-16 (1975).
23. Of course, the notion of political insularity is one of degree. Impossible to

quantify, it varies according to time, place, group, and perhaps issue. Classical pluralist political theory, as represented, for example, in R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS
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As our nation's history demonstrates, racial prejudice can result
in the systematic disadvantaging of certain groups-indeed, in
sets of rules and institutional arrangements that operate culturally to subordinate some racial groups. This subordination is of

course more pervasive than the occasional shifting of a group
from the winner's to the loser's column on the legislative
scoreboard. Besides tangible disadvantages in allocating private

rights and public services, racially prejudiced governmental action produces an additional harm to the groups against which it is

directed: It insults, stigmatizes, and demeans the dignity of group
members. 24
(1961), left small room for a concept of group insularity. This lack has been among
its major criticisms. See the summary of classical pluralist theory and major attacks upon it in W. GAmsoN,THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 9 (1975). Professor
Dahl himself appears to have come to accept this criticism in his third edition of
PluralistDemocracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent, which he has retitled Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance.Professor Dahl
employs the organizing concept of "polyarchies" rather than of pluralism. Dahl expressly cautions that his analysis
[a]pplies to the American polyarchy and persons permitted to participate
In it-whites for the most part. It does not apply to those excluded from it,
mainly blacks, nor to the hegemonic system used in the South (often with
the tacit consent of the North) to deny influence to blacks.

P. DAmL,

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

54 (1976).

Blacks and other racial minority groups are no doubt less politically insular today than they were a generation ago. This is in part a result of their effective enfranchisement and may also reflect a more general decrease in racial prejudice, or
at least an increase in the perception that one ought not to act in ways that make
one's prejudice manifest. Alternatively, the apparent decrease in black insularity
to some extent simply may reflect the general legal bar against overt racial classification and other forms of patently racially discriminatory state action. Because
this bar operates in many contexts, it assures some degree of common interest between blacks and other groups. It effectively requires governments wishing to disadvantage blacks (or advantage whites) to do so through policies that to some
extent disadvantage members of other groups (or advantage blacks) at the same
time. To the extent that we believe the truth probably lies somewhere between
these views, we may say that blacks are less insular than they used to be, but not
that blacks (or Jews, for that matter) have now reached the point where they can
fend for themselves in the political arena even without a constitutional bar against

discrimination. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CxVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS pt. II (1968). This
view, which seems on balance the most sensible one, necessarily concedes that
groups against which racial prejudice might be directed somehow are different
from other kinds of groups with respect to the "normal" functioning of the democratic process. "Insularity" does not seem such a bad word to use to describe this
difference. Under this view, one of the functions of the equal protection clause is
structuring the rules of the game of democracy to reduce the insularity of certain

groups precisely because we recognize the special dangers posed by prejudice.
24. The idea that segregation is unconstitutional because it is racially insulting
was first suggested by Professors Black and Cahn. Black, The Lawfulness of the
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The concept of racial insults and the cognate notions of stigma
and dignitary harm describe a genuine hurt that human beings
sometimes suffer. The reality and general nature of this hurt is
easily understandable to anyone who has been called, or who can
imagine what it feels like to be called, a "nigger" or a "dirty Jew."
I suspect that not many would dissent from the proposition that
for one human being to hurt another in this way is wrong and that
an even greater wrong occurs when the government does the
hurting.
Though the injury is real and understandable and the norm
against it plain, the concept of racial insult is elusive and thus difficult to define or criterialize. The term insult seems to have no
clearly established social usage. An individual may claim to have
been "insulted" by a wide variety of actions. If no moral or legal
consequences depend on his claim, society is inclined to accept
his word. Perhaps we respond this way because in this circumstance we understand his claim of "insult" as simply another way
of saying that his feelings have been hurt, as for example when
someone says another has insulted him by not inviting him to a
party.
However, when some moral or legal consequence does turn on
whether someone has insulted another, we cannot and do not understand the question to be equivalent to whether the "insultee's"
feelings have been hurt. When the insult occurs this way, we are
called upon to make a judgment more complex than simply asking whether someone's feelings have been hurt. If, for example,
the invitation list included only business associates and the excluded person was clearly not a business associate, we are unlikely to condemn the invitor.
The difference between insult as a synonym for hurt feelings
and as a normative term seems to be this: We regard actions
taken by others as insults in the latter sense only when, in addition to having hurtful effects upon self-respect or pride, we infer
that the actor made the statement partly because he disliked us
or wanted to hurt our feelings. Thus, the context in which another
acts or speaks often determines whether we regard it as insulting.
A friend might criticize someone with the avowed goal of helping
her get along better with others. The criticism might hurt her
friend's feelings, but it would not be understood as an insult so
long as the one criticized accepted her friend's account of her goal
or motive. If an enemy had made the same statement without explanation, it might well be taken as an insult. In other words,
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 150 (1955).
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insult and cognate terms imply assessments of attitudes or
goals-hence the excusal phrase "not intended as an insult." Consequently, if a third person (or a court) were called in to resolve a
disagreement about whether one person had insulted another, the
arbiter could not perform this task without assessing the attitudes
or goals that underlay the action at issue.
A racial insult is an action or statement that hurts the feelings
of racial group members and that we infer was taken or made
partly because the actor disliked or disrespected people of that
group. Consequently, if a court finds that racial prejudice played
a role in the decisionmaking process leading to a challenged action, the action is by definition a racial insult. However, a governmental action might hurt the feelings of some group members and
nevertheless not amount to a normative or unconstitutional racial
insult if a court finds that prejudice did not infect the action.
Of course, some actions or statements become, through experience, so identified with racial prejudice that we regard them as almost per se racially insulting; but this phenomenon occurs only
because our experience suggests that such actions or statements
rarely are taken or made apart from racially prejudiced attitudes.
The word nigger is an example. Notice, though, that even some
uses of this prejudice-loaded word would not be normatively
counted as insults. Consider, for instance, its use by a black comedian or a school teacher attempting to explain what prejudice
is and why it is wrong.25
Some governmental actions, like the word nigger, are so identified with racial prejudice that we do not assess motivation when
we brand them racial insults, stigmas, or dignitary assaults. For
example, we can understand laws requiring racial segregation as
racial insults without attending with great care to legislative motivation. The reason is not that such a normative judgment can be
made without reference to motives, but rather that it seems obvious that such laws would not have been enacted apart from racial
prejudice. The concepts of racial insult, stigma, and dignitary
harm simply have no intelligible meaning that may be divorced
from at least an implied assessment of motives.

25. For a sensitive discussion on the rites of initiation through which a white
admitted to a black group must go before his use of the word nigger will be received as non-insulting, see E. GOFFMAN, supra note 12, at 29.
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Remedial Implications and Causation
The constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination implements two basic norms. First, members of racial groups should
not be disadvantaged because of a distortion of the democratic
process resulting from racial prejudice ("process distortion").
Second, racial group members should not suffer the dignitary
harm caused by racially prejudiced governmental action ("dignitary harm"). Both these norms make inevitable an assessment of
motivation in racial equal protection cases, for neither is offended
by action that is not racially prejudiced, even if this action disproportionately disadvantages a racial group.
There is, however, a difference between the two norms, a difference which can become significant whenever, as will virtually
always be true, a plaintiff claims that a racially prejudiced governmental action harmed him in addition to insulting his dignity, and
he therefore requests remedial relief of some sort with respect to
this other harm. An action that a court finds was in any significant way prompted by prejudice is definitionally insulting, and for
this reason proof that the action was so prompted simultaneously
establishes a dignitary harm. Whether the plaintiff should be
granted relief with respect to other harms produced by such an
action is a more complicated question. The complication arises
from the possibility that although racial prejudice did play some
role, the governmental entity might have taken the same action
even apart from prejudice. 26
As this problem occurs in actual lawsuits, the critical issues are
usually evidentiary: Did racial prejudice play any role in the challenged action, and if so, would the government have taken the
same action apart from prejudice? We shall consider the evidentiary problems of and interdependences between these two issues
later. For now, let us engage in some unrealistic evidentiary assumptions, which, though in some ways misleading, are at this
point clarifying.
Consider a zoning board decision denying a variance for a lowincome housing project. Although the board's stated reason for
the denial is the incompatability between the project and the single-family dwelling character of the neighborhood, assume that a
court knows to a certainty that the board also wanted to keep out
of this white area the black population that the project would
probably attract. Assume further, however, that the court also
knows that the board would have denied a variance to any hous26. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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ing project or other property use in this exclusively single-family
dwelling area despite the race of those affected.
Undoubtedly this governmental action violates the dignitary
harm norm, for the court knows that action was taken partly on
the basis of racial dislike and is therefore racially insulting. The
fact that the action would have been taken for other reasons does
not erase the insult; our judgment of whether we have been insulted depends on the reason for which an action was in fact
taken.
If, for a moment, we back away from the judicial context and
ask whether the zoning board members have violated their oaths
to obey the Constitution by acting out of racial prejudice, the answer is surely that they have. Therefore, arguing the constitutional issue before the board would have been proper, as would
be a constitutionally based appeal to the electorate in the next
board elections. For the same reason, an inquiry into whether a
proposed appointive office holder is a racial bigot-for example, if
the question arises during Senate confirmation proceedings-seems proper and distinguishable from inquiries into candidate's other ideological positions.
Perhaps the courts should assign to unconstitutional governmental actions resulting from racial prejudice an operational
meaning that differs from currently established judicial responses. Arguably, for example, firing government employees for
making racially bigoted speeches should be treated differently for
first amendment purposes than firings for other kinds of
speeches. 27 Perhaps public officials should be subject to removal
from office for taking racially prejudiced actions or be liable for
punitive damages solely on the basis of the dignitary harm such
actions occasion.
However, in our zoning board case, the plaintiff is likely to request from the court some specific relief requiring the board to
grant the variance. The difficulty, of course, is that granting this
relief not only will place the plaintiff in a better position than she
would have been in had racial prejudice not affected the board's
decision but also will preclude the board from taking an action
that was within its constitutional power and that it would have
27. But cf. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wellingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(suppression of speech for purpose of promoting stable, integrated housing vio-

lated first amendment).
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taken regardless of its prejudice. Perhaps, as we have noted, the
courts could appropriately respond to this problem by developing
some intermediate form of relief. The important point for our pur-

pose is simply that, on our assumptions to this point, the court
probably could not properly mandate that the zoning board grant
the variance. In other words, in order for a plaintiff to be entitled
to such relief, a court should be satisfied that the harm about
which she complains (other than dignitary harm) would not have
occurred but for racial prejudice. More generally, in order to grant
relief on the basis of a violation of the process distortion norm, a
court must find not only that the governmental action was affected by prejudice but also that it was "caused" (in the necessary condition sense) by such prejudice.28
Our preliminary cautions regarding the unreality of the evidentiary assumptions in this hypothetical deserve emphasis. The
method of analysis that we used-raising legal questions on the
assumption that motives are fully known-is probably responsible for considerable confusion in the law and literature of motivation analysis. We shall see later that the evidentiary inferences in
which a court will necessarily engage when assessing whether racially prejudiced motivation played any role in a governmental action often simultaneously dispose of the causation issue. Even if
the issues are evidentially distinguishable, we shall discover that
when a plaintiff uses some kinds of evidence to prove that racial
prejudice did play a role, good reasons exist for imposing upon
the government a heavy burden of disproving causation.
Also worth emphasis is the fact that the causation issue's relevance depends entirely on the remedy the plaintiff is seeking. On
the facts of our hypothetical, a court order that the agency reconsider its variance decision would be pointless, for we stipulated
that the court knew that the board would make the same decision
the second time. However, in actual cases a plaintiff's proof that
racial prejudice influenced a governmental decision should, at a
minimum, entitle him to such an order, although this remedy may
not be the best one available.
Finally, we should distinguish this causation question from the
different issue of what kind of "harm" a plaintiff must prove that
he suffered in order to establish an equal protection violation that
is judicially remediable. Professor Dworkin has argued that enforcing the equal protection clause requires courts to make "inter28. The Supreme Court's holding last term in Mount Healthy City School Dist.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), thus essentially was correct, although, as discussed
later, the causation issue presents complexities that the Court appears not to have
fully appreciated. See text accompanying notes 175-79 infra.
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pretative" rather than "causal" judgments. 29 He also seems to
view the clause as banning racially prejudiced action and argues
that answering the question whether an action is prejudiced requires essentially that a court "interpret" the social meaning of
such action. Once an action is found to be prejudiced, the court
need not ask whether the action "caused" the plaintiff some measurable harm. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education30 need not have addressed the question
whether segregated schools were educationally harmful to black
children. All that was necessary was a finding that segregation
was a consequence of racial prejudice.
Professor Dworkin may be read as suggesting that the question
whether a plaintiff has been harmed by a racially prejudiced governmental action is simply irrelevant. However, the more accurate
interpretation of Dworkin probably is that a racially prejudiced
action is definitionally insulting and therefore harmful in the way
31
that we suggested previously.
There are three easily and often confused questions regarding
the relevance of harm to the constitutionality of school segregation. The first is whether it is necessary for a court to inquire
whether school segregation results in blacks getting an education
inferior to that which they would otherwise receive. The second is
whether it is possible to determine whether segregation is racially
insulting to blacks without inquiring whether the practice is in
any way harmful to them. The third is whether, if the plaintiff has
requested an order desegregating the schools, it is relevant to the
issuance of this remedy to ask whether the segregation would
have been mandated but for racial prejudice.
Professor Dworkin's position on the first issue-that no inquiry
into educational harm is relevant-is correct, but his reason for so
believing appears to be based on what I think are incorrect responses to the second and possibly the third issues. Apparently,
his position is that the question of educational harm is irrelevant
because segregation itself is a racial insult to blacks. The first dif29. Dworkin, Social Sciences and ConstitutionalRights--the Consequences of
Uncertainty,6 J.L &EDuc. 3 (1977).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Dworkin, Social Sciences and ConstitutionalRights-the Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 JJ. & EDUC. 3, 11 (1977). Of course, the "racial insult" understanding of Broum had its roots in the much earlier work of Professors Cahn and
Black. See authorities cited note 24 supra.

1057

ficulty with this position is that it is epistemologically circular.
How does Dworkin (or a court) know that the segregation is racially prejudiced and therefore an insult? His answer is that because of cultural influences, we almost instinctively respond in
expected ways to certain societal phenomena: We understand,
perhaps at a subconscious level, certain cause and effect sequences. We know that segregation is prejudiced the way we
know "that a cold causes snuffles."32 (The idea here seems to be
that segregation is a "symptom" of racial prejudice like snuffles
are a symptom of a cold.) This method of analysis is quite acceptable to me, but it is important to note that it implicitly accepts
that the process by which we interpret segregation includes an
assessment that the practice is "harmful" to blacks. We know not
only that the practice of segregation, like the word nigger, hurts
the feelings of blacks, but also, from our history and our cultural
experience, that segregation is relatively disadvantageous to
blacks both culturally and socially.
This assessment of the harmfulness of segregation is part of the
information on the basis of which we know that the practice is racially prejudiced and therefore insulting. If we do not feel the
need to ask a separate question about harm in a Brown-type situation, the reason is simply that the answer is obvious to a member of our culture, and it is for this reason that Dworkin is correct
in suggesting that such segregation is a "symptom" of prejudice.
In this sense, Brown is any easy case. Although the question of
discrete educational harm should have been irrelevant in Brown,
an implicit inquiry into whether segregation is culturally and socially disadvantageous to blacks is part of the evidentiary process
through which we conclude that the practice is racially prejudiced
and therefore insulting. Of course, cases much more difficult than
Brown do arise, for example, those involving so-called benign
classifications, in which an inquiry into whether an action is
harmful to the racial group it purports to benefit is an important
part of the evidentiary process through which we determine
whether the action is prejudiced.
The second difficulty with the Dworkin position is that it apparently assumes that finding segregation racially prejudiced and
therefore insulting justifies a desegregation order. The problem
here, as we have seen, is that an action may have been affected
by racial prejudice, even though it might have been taken if it
were not so affected. Professor Dworkin does not address this
32. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights--the Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6 JJ. & EDUC. 3 (1977) (quoting Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 150, 161 (1955)). See Dworkin, supra at 3, 4, 11.
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problem directly, and it plainly was not a real possibility in
Brown and similar cases, as we shall discuss later. However, one
might infer from some passages in his article that he believes that
once an action is proven to have been affected--or even potentially affected-by racial prejudice, the question whether the
same action would have been taken apart from prejudice should
simply be irrelevant.33 If this is Dworkin's position, I believe that
he is wrong. If instead, he means that the evidence used to prove
prejudice in some cases as a practical matter will eliminate causation as a distinct issue, or that special rules of evidence should be
applicable when the issue is causation, he is right. However, the
critical problem is delineating these evidentiary interdependencies and explaining and defining the circumstances in which different evidentiary rules are appropriate.
Attitudes and Goals
In virtually all racial equal protection lawsuits, the plaintiff
claims that the governmental action he challenges violates both
the dignitary harm and the process distortion norms. Therefore,
he seeks judicial relief from some injury (in addition to the dignitary harm) that he claims is a consequence of the fact that racial
prejudice distorted the decisionmaking process that led to the action. Because a causal connection between the prejudice and the
harm that he wants remedied is a necessary element in finding
that the process distortion norm was violated, the question for the
court is whether the government would have taken the action but
for racially prejudiced attitudes. It is this question that will occupy our attention for the remainder of this article.3 4
33. Id. at 11-12.
34 There are important connections between the thesis of this article and a
range of problems commonly associated with the state action doctrine. Although
this subject is by and large beyond the scope of this article, two of the problems
require explicit recognition: action versus inaction, and private prejudice.
The racial insult and process distortion norms are violated as much by racially
prejudiced governmental inaction or failures to act as by prejudiced action. Of
course, it will be difficult and often impossible for a plaintiff to prove that a governmental entity would have taken an action but for racial prejudice. If, however,
the proof hurdle is overcome by a plaintiff, the theory of this article would indicate
that a court should order the government to take the action it has failed to take. In
principle, this conclusion would be true even if the consequence were an order requiring a legislative body to enact legislation, whereas values associated with the
state action doctrine would seem to prohibit any such outcome.
The principal difficulty here is that it is none too clear what values are promoted
by the state action doctrine, which historically has been a mystifying corner of
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A finding that the government would not have taken a challenged action but for racially prejudiced attitudes is not necessarily equivalent to a finding that the action was taken in pursuit of
racially prejudiced goals. It is possible and in some cases probable that the decision process through which an individual or a
group determines to take an action can be so affected by
prejudiced attitudes that the action would not have been taken
but for these attitudes. Nevertheless, if we were somehow able to
observe the decision process directly, we might not describe the
action as taken in pursuit of a racially prejudiced goal. However,
in the vast majority of actual cases, the evidence on the basis of
which we would conclude that racial attitudes played a causal
role will ordinarily be circumstantial, and because of what seems
to be some sort of epistemological convention, we communicate
this conclusion through the statement that the action was taken
in pursuit of a prejudiced goal. Although the "goal" conclusion is
constitutional law. The doctrine probably serves as a kind of catch-all for several
values, different ones of which may be involved in any particular case. It seems
quite clear that there is no satisfactory way of generically differentiating action
from inaction that might suggest some principled distinction. Is an administrative
agency's failure to issue a license action or inaction, and how, apart from the institutional difference, does it differ from a legislative failure to legislate? As this illustration suggests, the principal values involved in any purported distinction
between action and inaction probably relate to institutional values and related
problems in fashioning judicially enforceable remedies. Thus, an administrative
agency's racially prejudiced license refusal is judicially remediable, and I argue
throughout this article that prejudiced administrative refusals to modify or to discontinue policies should be as well, but a legislative refusal to legislate is obviously more complex. The issue plainly deserves more attention than can be given
it here.
A second problem area is at least as troublesome. On the one hand, the racial
insult and process distortion norms in principle condemn governmental actions
taken not out of personal prejudice on the part of government officials but in response to the prejudiced tastes of their constituents or of consumers of public
goods. On the other hand, by virtue of the state action doctrine, the equal protection clause does not itself prohibit "private" prejudiced action. The first task of a
thorough analysis here, once again, would be to sort out the values promoted by
this reading of the clause.
My suspicion is that this interpretation rests partly on the same general institutional and remedial considerations as the action-inaction distinction and also
upon a special type of concern over individual liberty and privacy interests. Perhaps a main function performed by the state action doctrine is to remove from judicial (though not necessarily legislative) regulation prejudiced private acts
which, though they might not themselves be constitutionally protected under, say,
the freedom of association or the right to privacy, in some ways implicate such
other constitutional interests. On this view, the judicial refusal to hold at least
some forms of private discrimination (or governmental failure to outlaw private
discrimination) unconstitutional rests on the notion that the accommodation of
competing constitutional interests is best left, at least in the first instance, to the
legislative branch. In any event, any attempt to sort out the values promoted by
the state action doctrine and to consider what effect they should have with regard
to different kinds of private discrimination and public action taken on the basis of
private prejudice is beyond this article's scope.
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unnecessary and in some ways even misleading, this article will
in general adopt this convention.
The question whether racial prejudice played a role in a governmental action belongs to the family of "interpretive" questions
that most of us often ask about our actions and the actions of
others. In order to interpret behavior, we want to know whether
an action was taken because of some attitude or in pursuit of
some goal-for example, whether a person acted because he disliked someone else. At times we seek these answers because our
culture regards the attitudes that influence actions as relevant to
the latter's goodness or badness and at other times because we
simply want a better understanding of our own or of someone
else's actions.
Attitudes and emotions can affect actions in ways in addition to
what we would normally think of as "goals." An effect resulting
from an action is a "goal" of that action only when the person acted because he consciously desired to bring about that effect. On
the one hand, an individual's action may be racially prejudiced in
this goal sense if, for example, the person consciously acted to
disadvantage or segregate a group because he dislikes its race. On
the other hand, an individual's action can be racially prejudiced
even when he did not act in conscious pursuit of prejudiced goals.
Actors, both individual and governmental entities, sometimes
do not recognize the true attitudes that prompted their actions. 5
The familiar notion of "lying to oneself" reflects our understanding not only that people sometimes knowingly provide themselves
with false explanations of their own behavior, but also, and more
fundamentally, they sometimes cannot determine whether their
own explanation is true or false. Absent genuine recognition they
have at best an opinion about its truth or falsity. Our ability to
deceive ourselves in this way is probably greatest with regard to
attitudes and emotions such as racial prejudice that are powerful
and complex and that we would rather not admit even to ourselves.
35. See, e.g., H. FrNGAET rE, SELF DECEPTION (1969); Nisbeth & Wilson, Telling

More Than We CanKnow: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,84 Psyci. REV. 231
(1977). Occasionally, the Supreme Court has frankly admitted that conscious goals
are irrelevant. For example, in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court
held that the jury commissioners' testimony that they did not discriminate on racial bases could not overcome the extremely disproportionate pattern of jury selection: '"he result bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious
decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner." Id. at 482.
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Indeed, this sort of self-deception is precisely the function performed by racial stereotyping. A governmental decisionmaker
may believe that in taking a particular action he weighed only the
non-racial costs and benefits of various alternatives and "just happened" to choose one that, for example, specially disadvantaged
blacks. If a court is persuaded through circumstantial evidence
that the non-racial costs and benefits would not have been balanced as they were but for the effects of racial prejudice, it should
hold the action unconstitutional as clearly violative of the process
distortion and dignitary harm norms. The court is in no sense required to make the further inference that the decisionmaker took
the action in pursuit of the goal of disadvantaging blacks. Although the same circumstantial evidence supporting the inference that prejudice played a causal role will also support the goal
inference, this inference may or may not accurately describe the
decision process, and the former finding alone is a sufficient condition of unconstitutionality.
In an effort to facilitate communication, this article often adopts
goal terminology; however, when we say that a particular governmental action was taken in pursuit of prejudiced goals, what we
mean is that it would not have been taken but for racially
prejudiced attitudes. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Loving v. Virginia36 that the legislature's "goal" in enacting a miscegenation law was to "maintain White Supremacy"3 7
is acceptable to me not because I am entirely confident that either the legislators individually or the legislative body collectively
acted in conscious pursuit of this precise goal, but rather because
no serious doubt exists that such a law would not have been enacted but for racially prejudiced attitudes.
Normative and EvidentiaryIssues
When a plaintiff claims that a governmental action amounts to
unconstitutional racial discrimination, the only normative question for the court is whether the challenged action would have
been taken but for racial prejudice. The dispositive normative
question does not vary with the type of governmental action challenged, although the evidentiary issues may. In contrast, Professor Brest, though he appears no longer to subscribe to this view, 38
36. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. Id. at 11.
38. An Approach, note 3 supra. Professor Brest's more recent analysis indicates he now understands the suspect classification approach to function as a
"proxy" for the more direct question of prejudiced motivation, Brest, The Supreme
Cour, 1975 Term-Foreword In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,90
HARv. L REV. 1, 7, 15 (1976), or as a "prophylactic against improperly made deci.
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when writing his first article on motivation analysis 39 seemed at
one point to suggest that the motivation question is appropriate in
racial equal protection cases only when the plaintiff is challenging
certain types of actions.
Brest suggests that the term motivation analysis was being
used incorrectly to describe two different questions that courts
ask. According to Brest, it should be reserved only for the second.
These questions are: "(1) What (if any) operative rule is the decisionmaker systematically employing? (2) Why did the decisionmaker make a particular decision?" 40 As an example of cases
in which the first question was at issue, Brest offers Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.4 1 There the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had
been denied a laundry license because of his race. This finding
was based on an unexplained history of denying licenses only to
Orientals. Other cases in which Brest sees the first question as
the issue include those involving unexplained patterns of racially
disproportionate effect in jury selection, employment, voter registration, and pupil-teacher assignment. Under this view, the issue
in these cases is whether administrative bodies were using a
"covert rule" to exclude or segregate racial minorities.4 2
Brest contrasts such cases with those in which the pertinent
question centers on which criteria or objectives influenced the
decisionmaker in taking the challenged action. 43 He classifies
cases raising this issue into three groups. In the first, a rule requires the exclusion of blacks, but it is unclear whether a particular plaintiff was excluded because of this rule-that is, a college
admissions officer "follows a rule" of excluding blacks but claims
to have excluded the plaintiff on the basis of her grades without
even knowing that she is black. In the second, the challenged administrative action was not rule-governed, but the plaintiff claims
that the administrator took the action on the basis of racially impermissible considerations-that is, an admissions officer follows
no rule of exclusion but had just experienced an unpleasant encounter with a black student and for this reason excluded the
sions," id. at 15 n.65. Brest presumably now believes, contrary to at least some signals in his earlier work, An Approach, supra at 111-15, that the question of motive
is basic in both overt and covert race cases.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

An Approach, note 3 supra.
Id., at 111.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
An Approach, supra note 3, at 111-12.
Id., at 112-15.
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next black applicant. In the third, the rule is not overtly racial, but
the plaintiff claims that racially impermissible considerations influenced its enactment-for example, a legislative or administrative entity enacts an apparently neutral rule the true purpose of
which is to exclude blacks.
Professor Brest apparently believed that these two inquiries
were different either analytically or in principle and that only the
'second involved a "motivation" question, for only it "focuses on
the process by which the rule or decision was made." 45 The first
inquiry, by comparison, "aims at determining the content of a covert rule; and an impermissible operative rule, whether it is overtly
promulgated or concealed is substantively, and hence permanently, invalid."4 6 Thus, a rule excluding blacks from college
would be "substantively invalid," whereas excluding a black because of his grades would be permissible. A student's entitlement
is merely to a process that does not exclude him because he is
biack.
Professor Brest recognizes that an evidentiary distinction also
exists between these two kinds of inquiries. On the question of
whether a decisionmaker is employing that which Brest terms a
covert rule, evidence of historical-statistical racial effect patterns
will be available. In contrast, such evidence will usually be unavailable in the other kinds of cases with which he is concerned,
for the types of governmental actions these cases challenge are
generally ad hoc or nonsystematic. 47
The distinction to which Professor Brest has called attention is
a useful one, but it does not have the principled or analytic significance that he apparently accorded to it, at least at that time.
Rather, its importance is entirely evidentiary. Rules, whether racially overt or covert, and ad hoc governmental actions motivated
by racial considerations are unconstitutional and remediable by
courts under precisely the same circumstances-namely, whenever they are products of decision processes that have been distorted by racial prejudice.
Not all racially overt or covert rules are or ought to be unconstitutional, for not all would have been enacted or employed but for
racial prejudice. A required racial census and at least some kinds
of overt preferential treatment for blacks are examples of overt
racial rules that ought not to be unconstitutional. On exceedingly
rare occasions, an overt rule effected by prejudice should be up44.
45.
46.
47.
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held if a court is entirely confident that the same rule would have
been enacted even apart from prejudice. The same considerations
apply to covert rules and to ad hoe governmental decisions, as, for
example, in some circumstances, unannounced but systematically
preferential treatment for blacks or an ad hoc determination to locate a school or housing project the purpose of which is in part to
encourage racial integration.
None of these governmental actions-the racially overt or covert rules and the ad hoc decisions-are "substantively invalid" because with all, racial prejudice either played no role in the
decision process, or, if it did, a court could confidently find that
the same action would have been taken even apart from
prejudice. By contrast, a rule excluding blacks from college is
"substantively invalid," but only because it would be found to be
a product of a racially prejudiced process, as would an ad hoc decision to exclude a black unless the college established that he
was excluded only because of his grades.
Thus, the question whether the challenged governmental action
would have been taken but for racial prejudice is the question
that should determine the constitutionality of all governmental
action, including both overt and, to use Brest's term, covert rules.
Brest's description of cases in which the government was following a covertly discriminatory rule simply shows that in some situations the evidence establishes a pattern of decisionmaking
inexplicable on any plausible basis other than that racial
prejudice caused the challenged action. This evidentiary definition exhausts the meaning and significance of the category of covert rules. We shall see that the differences among other kinds of
governmental actions that may be and often are challenged as racially prejudiced-for example, overt racial rules and various ad
hoc actions-are also entirely evidentiary. The norms that apply,
and consequently the question that courts should ask, do not differ depending upon the type of governmental action challenged.
THE EVIDENTIARY SYSTEM FOR PROVING RACIALLY

PREJUDICED MOTIVATION

Because the determinative issue in a racial equal protection
suit is whether the challenged action would have been taken but
for racial prejudice, specifying the circumstances in which the
courts should find a violation of the clause turns upon an evidentiary analysis: Which kinds of evidence should give rise to which
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sorts of inferences, and how, in varying circumstances, should
burdens of proof be allocated? A complete consideration of this
problem would be almost impossible, for it would require discussing a virtually infinite number of potential governmental actions,
attendant factual patterns, and forms of evidence. Therefore, the
following comments are not intended to be complete, much less
exhaustive. They are, rather, an attempt to outline the structure
of evidentiary analysis in equal protection law and in so doing to
explain how some traditional mysteries in this body of law can be
clarified when viewed from an evidentiary perspective.
In theory, the logical place to begin is with a description and attempted classification of the various kinds of evidence that are
relevant to and probative of racially prejudiced motivation. To begin here, however, would require, in advance of any detailed and
concrete examples of the evidentiary system in operation, a relatively brief and abstract consideration of the full range of factual
configurations within which racial equal protection claims may
arise and be adjudicated. In the hope that a different organization
will be more clarifying, we shall depart from this logic and begin
by considering the actual operation of the evidentiary system for
determining whether racially overt rules or actions would have
been enacted or taken but for racial prejudice, focusing upon the
suspect classification doctrine and its various implications for
prejudiced and benign racial classifications.
Following this discussion, we shall move to the point at which
we might have logically begun-namely, a description and classification of the more important kinds of evidence that are relevant
and probative in the full range of equal protection cases. The classification offered is one that seeks to shed some light on the historical debate over "motivation" analysis in constitutional law-a
debate that sometimes has seemed to concern the meaningfulness of asking a question about the motivation of a multi-membered institution and that at other times has apparently centered
on the evidentiary ascertainability of "institutional motivation."
Thereafter, we shall consider which evidentiary consequences, if
any, should flow from the plaintiff's proof that a challenged action, although it may not have been racially overt, has produced a
significant racially disproportionate impact. Finally, we shall give
some abbreviated attention to the role of other kinds of evidence
in this proof process, focusing upon the evidentiary system under
which the "causation" issue should be adjudicated in cases in
which it is clear that racial considerations have played some role
in the challenged decision but less clear whether the same action
would have been taken but for prejudice.
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Strict Scrutiny and the Suspect ClassificationDoctrine
An assumption commonly made in equal protection cases is
that all racial classifications are suspect and therefore unconstitutional unless shown necessary for accomplishing a compelling
state interest or goal. Supreme Court decisions rightly support
the proposition that all racial classifications are inherently suspect; however, they do not and should not support the additional
proposition that all such classifications are unconstitutional unless necessary to a compelling goal. The fact that racial classifications are suspect means only that all racially overt rules should
receive special judicial scrutiny, in the sense that a court should
very carefully assess whether the rules would have been enacted
or maintained but for racial prejudice, with the burden of credibly
disproving such motivation upon the government. The statement
that racial classifications are unconstitutional unless shown necessary to a compelling goal is a description of a rule of evidence
applicable in some but not all cases in which a plaintiff challenges
a racially overt rule.
The "suspiciousness" with which courts should treat racially
overt classifications should and probably does extend to non-racially overt governmental action about which the plaintiff has
come forward with some credible and probative evidence suggesting that racial prejudice may have affected the decision process leading to the action. It does not and should not follow that
such evidence triggers the necessary to a compelling goal test, for
this rule of evidence is not a sensible one for determining the racial prejudice issue in such cases. However, when the plaintiff has
come forward with this evidence, the courts should never apply
the standard equal protection "rational basis" test in adjudicating
the action's constitutionality. Instead, the courts should demand
of the government, as in the case of racially overt rules, a credible, nonprejudiced explanation of the action.
The kinds of government defensive claims and evidence that
will discharge the burden of establishing a credible nonprejudiced
explanation of such action vary. They vary depending upon the
strength of the inference of prejudice warranted by the terms of
the rule or admitted use of racial criteria and upon whatever additional evidence the plaintiff may submit. With regard to non-racially overt actions, that which will be necessary to discharge the
burden depends upon the probative force of the plaintiff's evi1067

dence of prejudice, which in turn is to some extent dependent
upon the type of action challenged.
The evidentiary function and significance of the suspect classification doctrine cannot be understood apart from the actual
cases in which the court fashioned it and the cultural reality out
of which these cases grew. The rule emerged during a period
when a substantial segment of the country enforced through the
law a regime of racism known as segregation, and it developed in
cases challenging that regime. This national experience strongly
suggested that racially overt rules functioned almost exclusively
to institutionalize an interlocking set of disadvantages-a separate and subordinated culture-for black and for other racially
disrespected or disliked groups. Segregation was not a unique instance of racism in American culture, for it was predated by slavery and coexisted with the immigration period during which the
signs of racial and ethnic prejudice by and against many different
groups were obvious and widespread. The Supreme Court became institutionally familiar with the symptoms of prejudice not
only in cases that dealt with segregation and other forms of overt
racial discrimination but also in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska48
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters49 that involved indirect governmental responses to immigration.
In short, racial legislation in the United States was not a source
of national pride at the time the Supreme Court seriously began
to turn its attention to the problem. The suspect classification
doctrine emerged during this period in cases challenging racially
overt rules. The fact that the rules were racial in terms conclusively established that racial considerations were taken into account in the decision process. This same fact gave rise to a very
strong, if not conclusive, inference that the rules would not have
been promulgated but for these racial considerations, for it is difficult to believe that a decisionmaker who. has conditioned private
rights or governmental services on race would have imposed the
same standards had he never considered race. Finally, and most
importantly, our historical and cultural experience to the time
gave every reason to believe that this racial motivation was
prejudiced against, not beneficient toward, the minority groups
singled out by the challenged rules. By virtue of historical and
cultural experience, the Supreme Court could confidently identify
certain types of racially overt rules as part of a regime of racism
or as "symptomatic" of prejudice. Moreover, because of our his.
torical and cultural experience, the Court could infer that those
48. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
49. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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rules that might not be clearly symptomatic but that nevertheless
singled out minority groups for clear disadvantages were probably causally affected by prejudice.
Through the suspect classification doctrine, the Supreme Court
was able to formalize the very high probability that laws the operation of which was expressly conditioned on race would not have
been enacted apart from racially prejudiced attitudes. However,
the Court was not willing to hold that all racial classifications
were per se illegal because, presumably, it realized that a racial
classification does not necessarily establish prejudiced motivation. Instead, it designated racial classifications "suspect," meaning that they are probative evidence of prejudice and hence of a
violation of both the process distortion and dignitary harm
norms. The critical issue is determining that which the government must establish in order to dispel this inference. Although
the cases rightly make clear that the government must very persuasively show that the challenged action was not caused by racial prejudice, they differ about the types of evidence with which
this defense can be proven.
Racially overt classifications that are clearly identifiable as
symptomatic of prejudice or that single out a minority racial
group or groups for clear disadvantage will be found to have been
caused by racial prejudice unless the government establishes that
the classification is "necessary to a compelling goal" other than
one that is racially prejudiced. 0 This evidentiary standard has
two important characteristics: First, it imposes upon the government an extraordinarily heavy burden of persuasion; second, it
makes the determination of the prejudice issue entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence-that is, the issue is determined
on the basis of the importance of the nonprejudiced goal that the
government argues the classification serves and on the availability of alternative non-racial means by which this goal might be
achieved. Evidence of "innocent" legislative history and the like is
simply unavailing.
The heavy burden of persuasion that the suspect classification
doctrine places upon the government reflects the high probability
that these kinds of racial classifications were caused by
prejudiced attitudes. When the challenged rule is conducive to a
strong inference that it would not have been enacted but for ra50. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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cial prejudice, the Court rightly treats the rule as creating an almost irrebuttable presumption of prejudice. Only evidence that
such a rule was necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling
goal apart from prejudice is probatively forceful enough to dispel
this presumption. In an analogous situation, extremely forceful
evidence would be necessary to persuade us that someone who
calls blacks "niggers" is not motivated by racially prejudiced attitudes.
The suspect classification doctrine's exclusion of all but circumstantial evidence simply reflects the fact that other forms of evidence are not sufficiently reliable to warrant the costs of
reception. 51 Again, the problem is partly one of "lying," in that
legislative history can be rigged and testimony deliberately distorted, and partly one of legislators not having been aware of the
role prejudice played in their own actions. If a person who habitually calls blacks "niggers" testifies that his action was not affected
by racially prejudiced attitudes, such testimony is frankly not
very probative, and it does not become any more so even if we
think he "really believes" that he is not prejudiced.
To repeat, the important point is that the 'Justification stage" of
the suspect classification doctrine functions as an evidentiary
process through which the court determines whether the government can persuasively dispel the presumption that prejudice
causally affected the legislative or administrative process. If counsel defending a challenged classification of this sort were to admit
that the purpose of a segregation requirement is to "keep the
blacks in their place," he would supply the proof of prejudice for
which the Court is looking. Therefore, he attempts to explain the
classification by reference to some non-racial goal. The Court,
however, realizing that the currents of racial prejudice, especially
against blacks, have historically run deep in our society, finds it
51. Perhaps a complete account of the cruciality of circumstantial evidence
would also include some reference to the Supreme Court's supervision of the
lower federal courts. At the time the suspect classification doctrine developed,
many observers believed that lower court judges, especially in the South, were
themselves so racially prejudiced that they could not be entrusted to protect the
rights of blacks. Allowing conclusive weight to testimony by legislators, for example, that their actions were not affected by prejudice could have relatively insulated lower court outcome-determinative findings from appellate supervision.
Exclusive reliance on circumstantial evidence reduces this problem considerably
by virtue of the traditionally greater appellate court supervision over circumstantial inferences. The general problem of appellate supervision of lower court determinations concerning whether challenged action would have been taken but for
racially prejudiced motivation is a pervasive problem in motivation analysis, and
admittedly it may raise problems for the motive theory proposed in this article.
This subject requires independent, extensive, and careful analysis and is, unfortunately, beyond this article's scope.
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difficult to believe that such racial classifications would have
been enacted apart from prejudice. The extraordinary justification requirement is a way of formalizing this thoroughly war-

ranted skepticism.
In effect, the Court is saying, "We are going to assume that any
racial classification that is symptomatic of prejudice or that singles out a minority racial group for clear disadvantage would not
have been enacted but for prejudice. In order for the government
to persuade us that such prejudice played no significant part in
the law's passage, it must prove that (1) the law serves a nonprejudiced goal that is normally regarded as so important that we can
with some confidence draw the inference that reasonable decisionmakers would have taken the challenged action to accomplish
it whether they were affected by racial prejudice (the compelling
goal requirement); and (2) alternative non-racial means for accomplishing this important goal are either essentially nonexistent
or are sufficiently costly as to support the inference that reasonable decisionmakers would have chosen a racial classification to
avoid these costs whether or not they were affected by racial
prejudice (the necessary means requirement)."
The Supreme Court has applied the necessary to a compelling
goal rule of evidence only in cases involving racially overt rules or
regulations that are symptomatic of racial prejudice or that
clearly single out a minority racial group to its obvious disadvantage. The dominant characteristic demanded of a Court confronted with required segregation in public facilities5 2 or state
bans on interracial sex and marriage 53 was courage, not analytic
elegance. The celebrated cases dealing with these issues have
been repeatedly discussed elsewhere and require no attention
here.
54
The Japanese exclusion cases, Hirabayashiv. United States
55
and Korematsu v. United States, are more difficult. Both in52. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (prisons); Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms); New Orleans City Park Improvement
Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (schools).
53. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
54. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
55. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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volved challenges to the wartime exclusion of people of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast-racially overt rules that clearly
singled out a minority group for disadvantage. In Korematsu we
find the genesis of the suspect classification doctrine and the occasion of Justice Black's statement for the Supreme Court that
"[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence
of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."56 Yet the Court
sustained the challenged government actions in both cases.
The key question in these cases, though not one the significance of which appears to have been fully appreciated by the
Court, concerned the constitutionality of the government's failing
to respond to changing circumstances by repealing or at least declining to enforce laws and regulations the enactment of which
may well not have been caused by racial prejudice. The Japanese
bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. On December 8, 1941,
Congress declared war against Japan, and between this time and
late March, 1942, Congress, the President, and the military
promulgated the various rules and regulations attacked in the
cases. 5 7 Hirabayashiwas prosecuted for a violation that occurred
in mid-May, 1942,58 and Korematsu for a late-May violation. 59 The
former case reached the Supreme Court in the spring of 1943, the
latter in the fall of 1944.
In both cases, the Court adamantly refused to question whether
the government's fear of imminent Japanese invasion and sabotage turned out to be "true" or well-founded as of the trial date or
of the date of Supreme Court review. Instead, both Courts confined their attention to "the conditions with which the President
and Congress were confronted in the early months of 1942,"60 insisting that the question was whether the government had
"ground for-believing" 6 1 that there were disloyal members of the
population and "that in a critical hour such persons could not
readily be isolated and separably dealt with."62 The Hirabayashi
Court discussed at some length the national security considerations supporting the government's actions, 63 and the Korematsu
56. Id. at 216.
57. In Hirabayashi,the regulation under attack imposed a curfew on all persons of Japanese ancestry residing on a military base. 320 U.S. at 83. The regulation attacked in Korematsu excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from
"military areas." 323 U.S. at 215-16.
58. 320 U.S. at 84.
59. 323 U.S. at 220.
60. 320 U.S. at 93.
61. Id. at 218.
62. Id. 'We cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight--now say at the time these actions were unjustified." 323 U.S. at 224.
63. 320 U.S. at 92-99, 101-02.
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Court included this discussion by reference. 64 Neither Court apparently regarded the approximately two-month period between
the promulgation of the regulations and the time of violation as
significant, Hirabayashisustaining the "curfew order as applied,
and at the time it was applied,"65 and Korematsu sustaining the
exclusion order "as of the time it was made and when the peti-

tioner violated

it."66

If we assume that these were the only times at which racially
prejudiced motivation was constitutionally relevant, the Supreme
Court's decisions are understandable, not on the unrealistic
ground that racial prejudice played no role in the promulgation of
the rules and regulations, but rather on the ground that prejudice
did not play a causative role. Under this view, the critical question
was whether the government would have taken the same action
even apart from prejudice against Japanese. It was this question
that the Court, on the basis of what it regarded as the government's well-founded and good faith fears in the wake of Pearl
Harbor, answered with a '"yes":
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the
imprisonment of a loyal citizen... because of racial prejudice.... To
cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the
real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility
to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire ....67

In these cases the Court did not ask the subsequently formulated necessary means or less restrictive alternative question.
However, on our time assumption, asking this question would not
necessarily have affected the case's outcome. Again, it might well
be true that with the benefit of hindsight, including of course the
knowledge that the feared invasion never occurred, an objective
observer would conclude that the military might have pursued its
goals as efficiently by using non-racial means-for example, general loyalty screenings; but on this assumption, the judgments
from hindsight were not dispositive. The issue was whether, given
the fears and perceived emergency at the time the regulatory regime was promulgated and the violations occurred, the Supreme
Court could reasonably conclude that the military would have
64.
65.
66.
67.

323 U.S. at 217-18.
320 U.S. at 102.
323 U.S. at 219.
Id. at 223.
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chosen a racial means over more cumbersome and time-consuming alternative means even apart from racial prejudice.68
The Japanese exclusion cases, in sum, illustrate that on rare occasions even a racially overt rule whose promulgation cannot realistically be found to be completely independent of prejudiced
motivation can be constitutional because, given a reasonably perceived emergency at the time of its promulgation, it is credible
that the government believed it a necessary means to accomplish
a compelling goal independent of prejudice. In the Japanese exclusion cases or in any case in which racial prejudice played a
role in an action that a court is persuaded would have been taken
anyway because of some reasonably perceived emergency, the basic problem is determining which constitutional consequences
should follow after the emergency is over. Suppose, for example,
that the various exclusionary rules and regulations were kept in
force following the end of the war and that the defendants were
prosecuted for a violation in 1947. At a minimum, a decision to
prosecute in these circumstances should clearly be held to be motivated by racial prejudice, for no other reasonably plausible explanation would exist for this exercise of discretion. Furthermore,
a legislative refusal to repeal or rescind the racially exclusionary
rules in this situation would be virtually impossible to explain on
grounds other than racial prejudice, and the Supreme Court probably has adequate powers to remedy this wrong by simply enjoining the operation of the exclusionary system.69 The Japanese
exclusion cases are thus most troubling not because the Court
found that the challenged rules would have been promulgated
even apart from prejudice, but because it refused seriously to
consider whether maintaining the exclusionary system and continuing its enforcement as of the time the cases reached the
Court could be explained on grounds other than racial prejudice.
We can usefully contrast the segregation, miscegenation, and
Japanese exclusion cases with three decisions involving racially
overt rules in which the Supreme Court did not invoke the neces-

68. The Korematsu Court stated.
Here, as in the Hirabayashicase ... we cannot reject as unfounded the
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not
be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making
branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a
critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately

dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety,
which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard
against it.
Id. at 218.
69. See note 34 supra.
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sary to a compelling goal test: Anderson v. Morton,70 Morton v.
Mancari,7 ' and United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh,
Inc. v. Carey.7 2 The plaintiffs in Anderson challenged a Louisiana
statutory requirement that the race of each candidate for public
office appear opposite his name on the ballot. The Supreme Court
did not say that all racial ballot designation requirements are per
se unconstitutional. Nor did the Court even say that the challenged racially overt rule was "suspect" in the sense that its constitutionality was to be determined under the necessary to a
compelling goal standard. However, in holding it unconstitutional,
the Court did scrutinize the challenged statute more closely than
73
would be required under the rational basis test.
The racially overt statute challenged in Anderson did not trigger the necessary to a compelling goal rule of evidence because
the statute could not be clearly identified as a symptom of
prejudice or as an obvious disadvantage to blacks. Under some
circumstances racial ballot designations might be designed to protect blacks in voting majorities against demonstrable white manipulation, and this situation would present a different case.
Nonetheless, because the challenged rule was racially overt, the
Supreme Court correctly regarded it with suspicion and in effect
found that the government had not carried the burden of disproving prejudiced motivation, noting that the statute was passed in
1960 and had to be understood in light of the widespread racial
74
prejudice then existing in Louisiana.
The other two cases, Morton and U.J.O., involved so-called benign racial classifications-the former, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employment preference for Indians, and the latter, a
racial reapportionment of voting districts designed to enhance
black voting power. Later we shall discuss these cases at some
length. For now, suffice it to say that although neither the unanimous Morton Court nor six of the eight Justices participating in
the U.J.O. case characterized the racial classifications as "suspect," they did closely scrutinize the challenged actions for signs
70. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). Cf. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam) (separation of persons on government lists on basis of race unconstitutional ; listing of

race on divorce degrees constitutional).
71. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
72. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
73. 375 U.S. at 403-04.
74. Id. at 403.
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of racial prejudice, but not by using the necessary to a compelling
goal rule of evidence.
Racially Benign Motivation
Neither the dignitary harm nor the process distortion norm outlaws all governmental actions taken on the basis of racial considerations or for the accomplishment of racial goals. The norms
condemn government actions only when they result from racial
prejudice. The distinction in principle is clear enough. 75 The difficulty is in determining whether an action affected by racial considerations was or was not affected by prejudice. This is an
evidentiary problem, and, not surprisingly, there are both relatively easy and difficult cases.
We have seen that racially overt rules or actions that are symptomatic of prejudice or that single out a minority racial group for
clear disadvantage give rise to an almost irrebuttable presumption of prejudiced motivation. However, not all overtly racial rules
or actions warrant this strong presumption of prejudice, and, consequently, some should not trigger the necessary to a compelling
goal rule of evidence. Consider, for example, the BIA employment
preference for Indians upheld in Morton v. Mancari,7 6 the law
and medical school admissions preference for blacks and for
other designated racial minority groups involved in DeFunis v.
Odegaard77 and in the Bakke78 case, the racial reappointment
designed to enhance black voting strength upheld in the U.J.O.
case, 79 and the nonconstitutionally required decision by local
school authorities to integrate the schools apparently approved in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.80 The racially overt rules or actions challenged in these cases are obviously not culturally symptomatic of racial prejudice, and they do
not single out a minority racial group for clear disadvantage.
Quite the contrary, actions like the first three appear to single out
such groups for advantages, and the final one, to integrate rather
than segregate races. For this reason, the racially overt actions in
Morton and U.JO. and in the Swann dicta did not and those in
Bakke should not create the strong presumption of prejudiced
motivation that triggers the necessary to a compelling goal rule of
75. See note 1 supra.
76. 417 U.S. 535.

77. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and remanded as moot, 416 U.S.
312 (1974).
78. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of CaL, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811).
79. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
80. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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evidence. 8 1
Racially overt rules like these, however, are not and should not
be immune from close judicial scrutiny. The possibility is sufficiently great that any overt racial rule, despite its facial appear-

ance, was so causally affected by prejudice as to warrant careful
judicial review. The probability that such actions were caused by
prejudice is not as great as in the case of strong presumptively
prejudiced rules, and for this reason evidence that falls short of
satisfying the necessary to a compelling goal standard can be sufficiently reliable and forceful to negate the possibility that the
rule was caused by racial prejudice. The burden of proving that a
racially overt rule was not motivated by prejudice should always
rest with the government, so that in doubtful cases the rule
should be struck down. How much and what kind of evidence is
necessary to satisfy this burden depends upon the extent to
which the terms of the challenged rule or other evidence produced by the plaintiff give rise to a fair suspicion of prejudice.
It is always possible that an overt rule that facially singles out
racial minority groups for special advantages was in fact moti-

vated by racial prejudice against any of three groups. First, the action might have been motivated by prejudice directed against the
general majority group not entitled to the advantage. The conferral of an advantage upon blacks or upon blacks together with
other minority groups like Asians and Chicanos might have been
motivated by prejudice against the general white majority group.
Second, the action might have in truth been motivated by
81. For general discussions of the so-called benign discrimination problem, see
generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. UJ. REV. 363 (1966); Note, Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection,82 HAY. L. REV. 1065 (1969). Most of the law review
literature has focused on the higher education preferential admission issue. A substantial sampling of the literature includes: Askin, The Case for Compensatory
Treatment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 65 (1969); Bell, In Defense of Minority Admission
Programs:A Response to Professor Graglia,119 U. PA. I REV. 364 (1970); Ely, The
Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cm. L REV. 723 (1974);
Flaherty & Sheard, DeFunis, The Equal Protection Dilemma: Affirmative Action
and Quotas, 12 DUQUESNE L REV. 745 (1974); Graglia, Special Admission of the
"CulturallyDeprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L REV. 351 (1970); O'Neil, Preferential Admission Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education,
80 YALE LJ. 699 (1971); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of
PreferentialTreatment of Racial Minorities,1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Sandalow, Racial
Preferencesin Higher Educatio. PoliticalResponsibility and the JudicialRole, 42
U. CHL L REV. 653 (1975). In addition, two entire law review issues, each containing several articles, are devoted exclusively to this issue: 75 COLUM. I REV. 483
(1975); 60 VA. L. REV. 917 (1974).
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prejudice against the racial minority group that it appears to advantage. Appearances are at times deceptive, and closer analysis
may suggest either that an apparent or arguable advantage is really a disadvantage or that the advantage has been "packaged" in
such a way that it manifests symptoms of racism. Finally, the action might have been motivated by prejudice against some subgroup not entitled to the preference. This subgroup might be
either a part of the white majority, like Jews or Italians, or an excluded minority subgroup like Indians. For these reasons, all racially overt rules should be carefully scrutinized by the courts,
with the government bearing the burden of credibly establishing
that a challenged rule pursues nonprejudiced racial goals.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Morton and U.J.O. do not avowedly rest on the analytic approach suggested here, though they
are essentially consistent with it and quite difficult to explain
coherently in other terms. In Morton, for example, the Court
rejected a constitutional attack on section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act, which grants employment preferences in the BIA
to Indians, effectively exempting them from competitive civil
service requirements. 82 The Court quite rightly held that the
1preference does not constitute 'racial discrimination,' "83 but it
reached this conclusion on the basis of a mystifyingly disingenuous analysis:
Indeed, it is not even a '"racial preference." Rather, it is an employment
criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self.government and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent
groups .... Here the preference is reasonably and directly related to a lethat
gitimate, nonracially based goal. This is the principal characteristic
84
generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial discrimination.

The Supreme Court was correct in concluding that the preference did not amount to racial discrimination, but the reason is not
that it was not "racial" or that it served a "nonracially based
goal." Indeed, the main body of the Morton opinion suggests that
the Court was itself uneasy with these characterizations, for its
rather careful analysis of the preference's historical background
and legislative history would hardly have been necessary under
the traditional rational basis test that presumably would be applicable if there were nothing "suspicious" about the challenged law.
The preference was available only to individuals who were members of a federally recognized tribe and "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood."85 If a rule excluding everyone who fails to
meet a specification as to racial lineage is not a "racial classifica82.
83.
84.
85.
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417 U.S. at 553.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 553 n.24.
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tion," it is difficult to imagine what is. Similarly, the preference's
goal as correctly characterized by the Supreme Court---"Indian
self-government" 86 -- is obviously not a "nonracial" goal.
The BIA employment preference did not amount to racial discrimination because it was not motivated by racial prejudice. The
preference at issue in Morton singled out Indians for special advantage, whereas the earlier racially overt rules that reached the
Court had singled out blacks or other racial minorities for disadvantage. This difference has two significant evidentiary implications for determining the prejudiced motivation issue. First, it is
considerably easier in general to believe that the government
might have reasons independent of racial prejudice for advantaging Indians (or blacks) relative to other groups than it is to believe that it might have nonprejudiced reasons for advantaging
whites relative to blacks or for segregating these groups. Second,
while Indians, blacks, and indeed virtually all racial or ethnic subgroups are political minorities, "whites" as a group comprise a
majority both in the population at large and in Congress. For reasons that Professor Ely has elaborated,8 7 it is not very believable
that the white majority group will take actions based on prejudice
against itself.
Both these probabilities are founded upon common knowledge
of our own historical and cultural reality. Imagine that a typically
largely white legislative or administrative body is choosing between two alternative employment tests, both of which will admittedly produce equally qualified work forces and are otherwise
equivalent in cost. The only difference is that test A would result
in virtually no Indian (or black) workers being hired, and test B
would result in a work force that would be ten percent Indian (or
black). If test A were chosen, most people who have lived in our
culture for any length of time would be suspicious that prejudice
against Indians (or blacks) played some role in the decision.
However, choosing test B would not generate a comparable sus86. Id. at 551.
87. Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHL L
REV. 723 (1974). It is not nearly as improbable that some members of racial minority groups will be prejudiced against members of their own groups because it is
more likely that they will internalize the prejudiced attitudes of the wider society,
as the Court appears to have recognized in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1976). Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (the famous "hearts
and minds" passage). For a discussion of minority group self-hate, see G. ALLPORT,
supra note 12, 150-53; E. GoFFmAN, supra note 12, at 32-40.
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picion of racial prejudice against whites. The reason for suspicion
in the first case is that, on the one hand, we have ample reason to
believe that many whites are prejudiced against groups like Indians and blacks, and on the other, it is simply difficult to describe
some reason for preferring whites that does not imply a relative
racial dislike of Indians (or blacks). In the second case, by comparison, we have little reason to believe that whites are prejudiced against whites, and it is easy to imagine plausible reasons,
independent of prejudice against whites, for preferring Indians
(or blacks)-namely, to remedy the continuing adverse effects of
prior dealings with Indians (or blacks) that are now regarded as
unfair or immoral; to enhance the social.position, status, and selfrespect of economically, socially, and politically subordinate racial groups; and to take at least some small steps toward integrating our still racially splintered society so that perhaps our
grandchildren's grandchildren will live in a nation where racial
identity is not necessarily irrelevant but where prejudice no
longer exists and words like nigger are no longer necessary to describe the way people feel about each other.
In other words, the difference between Morton and prior cases
involving racially overt rules is the degree to which the challenged rules, given this background of culturally based, common
sense probabilities, were themselves probative evidence of racially prejudiced motivation. What differentiates Morton from
these earlier cases is that the challenged rule itself was not very
probative of prejudice, and for this reason the government was
both allowed and able to prove that the preference was not enacted out of prejudice through evidence that, though credible,
would not have qualified under the necessary to a compelling goal
standard. We shall call a racially overt rule or action that does not
itself warrant a strong presumption of prejudice a facially benign
classification.
The plaintiffs in Morton did not offer any evidence suggesting
that the preference discriminated against them as members of
any racial subgroups or that it discriminated against Indians.
Their claim was that the preference discriminated against them
as members of the excluded white majority group. Of course, no
doubt existed that whites were excluded from the preference, but
this exclusion would have amounted to "racial discrimination"
against whites only if motivated by anti-white prejudice. The government claimed that the preference's goal was to make the BIA,
the entity that effectively governs Indians, more responsive to its
wards. Obviously, nothing about this goal implies any racial dislike or disrespect for whites. The sole question in the case was
1080
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whether this nonprejudiced account of motivation was credible.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's rather mystifying assertion
that the preference and its goals were "nonracial," the Justices in
fact examined the preference's facial terms, the historical, social,
and political context in which it operates, and its legislative history to conclude that the government's claimed racially related
88
but benign goal was credible.
In a Morton-type challenge to a preference, the plaintiff always
has the option of attacking the factual basis of the allegedly benign goal, claiming that the social problem to which it is addressed is not real or, even if it is, that the racial preference
cannot be regarded as a valid response. In cases in which such
claims are advanced, if they are at all facially plausible, judicial
reliance upon, for example, legislative history often will not be
satisfactory. This situation can occur when the plaintiff is able to
cast some doubt on the truthfulness of the facts on the basis of
which the action was allegedly taken or in some other way is able
to raise an inference that the legislative record was distorted or
otherwise not fairly representative of actual motivation. A record
of legislative or administrative proceedings consistent with benign motivation should, of course, always be supportive of an inference of nonprejudice, but it should, nevertheless, not be
beyond impeachment by other circumstantial evidence. Moreover,
in many cases, no such record will exist.
A plaintiff's plausible claim that the allegedly benign goal or racial classification lacks a factual basis should shift the burden of
proof on this issue to the government. Such a claim, if it were not
disproven, would substantially impeach the allegedly benign goal
claim and therefore strongly support an inference of prejudiced
motivation of one of the three previously mentioned varieties. In a
case like Morton, when the action has been taken by a mainly
white Congress, the probability of anti-white prejudice remains
remote; but such evidence would be quite probative of prejudice
against either the apparently benefitted group and/or, if additional evidence existed, some subgroup not entitled to the preference.
A claim that a facially benign classification (except for one that
is exceptionally bizarre) was motivated by prejudice against subgroups is a species of "covert discrimination" attack with which
88. 417 U.S. 535, 541-45, 551-55 (1974).
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we shall deal in a later section. Aside from a classroom hypothetical expressly granting preferential treatment to virtually every racial and ethnic group except, say, Italians and Asians, the benign
classification will not facially contain any evidence of subgroup
prejudice. A preference for blacks and Orientals does not itself
suggest, for example, antisemitic or anti-Chicano motivation. For
this reason, the process of determining whether a benign classification was motivated by subgroup prejudice involves evidentiary
considerations substantially the same as those involved in deciding whether a law or other governmental action that is racially
neutral on its face was in fact covertly motivated by prejudice
against some racial group. Although this problem, as we shall see,
has usually arisen in connection with protecting blacks, the equal
protection clause obviously covers members of any group who
can make the requisite evidentiary showing suggesting prejudice
against their race.
The only general difference between discrimination attacks on
racially neutral actions and excluded subgroup attacks on benign
classifications arises, on the one hand, because the latter can be
(though are not necessarily) a more effective and therefore easier
way of fencing out racial groups than are the former, 89 and on the
other hand, because either the allegedly benign goal or the racial
classification as a way of achieving it can appear (though not necessarily) very peculiar. 90 These differences will be appropriately
reflected in the evidentiaryposture of a subgroup covert discrimination attack on a facially benign classification, for they can affect
the extent of provable disproportionate impact and, in the face of
some evidence supporting a subgroup prejudice claim, the credibility of a claimed benign goal.91 This statement is not made to
suggest that every racial or ethnic group has an equal probability
of proving that a facially benign classification was motivated by
subgroup prejudice, but the differences in the chance of successful proof reflect the probability in our contemporary culture that
prejudiced governmental action is likely to be taken against the
group which is at issue. Thus, an attack on a preference for blacks
89. Obviously, benign classifications are not necessarily more likely than racially neutral classifications to disadvantage racial subgroups. For example, of

those displaced by a 10% law school preferential admission quota for blacks, half
might be Jews, resulting in a small decline in Jewish admissions. By contrast, a
local residency requirement for admission, neutral on its face, might exclude virtu-

ally all Jews.
90. For example, a claim of some type of compensatory justice goal for a preference for racial or for ethnic groups the members of which are, by all available
empirical evidence, socially well-accepted and well-integrated and normally distributed among socioeconomic classes would appear peculiar. For a general discussion of "peculiar" goal claims, see notes 157-66 and accompanying text infra.
91. See notes 141-74 and accompanying text infra.
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on the grounds of anti-Irish motivation and an attack on a preference for Irish on grounds of anti-black motivation are both species of covert discrimination claims, although in an actual case
(should one ever arise), the probability of the two plaintiffs suc92
cessfully proving their claims is obviously not the same.
However, the facial terms of a Morton-like preference do give
rise to some suspicion that it might have been motivated by
prejudice against the apparently benefitted group, and for this if
for no other reason a plausible claim by the plaintiff that the allegedly benign goal or racial classification lacks a factual basis
should shift the burden of proof to the government. Because here
the function of the required proof is to provide factual substantiation for the government's benign goal claim, shifting the burden
in this way will also provide a check against anti-white and subgroup prejudice. The reason that a Morton-type preference gives
rise to some suspicion of prejudice against the apparently benefitted group is that it exempts this group from some skill-related
qualification required of non-benefitted group members and is
consistent with a prejudiced motive to create the impression that
the benefitted group is inferior.
To say that such a preferential exemption is consistent with
prejudiced motivation is not to suggest that a classification of the
sort involved in Morton fairly gives rise to a strong inference of
prejudice, for quite obviously it does not. A common sense knowledge of our own culture suggests that it is at least as probable
that without the exemption Indians would have failed to qualify
for BIA employment at a significantly higher rate than did other
racial groups. If this is true, the probable reason for the preferential exemption is simply to permit accomplishing the nonprejudiced goal of increasing BIA responsiveness to ndians. In this
event, it would be no more sensible to describe the government as
acting in order to "create the impression that Indians are inferior"
than it would be to so describe its motivation had it refused to
create the exemption, for such a refusal would amount to knowingly sanctioning a system that rejects Indians on skill grounds,
thus "creating the impression they are inferior." Perhaps both
these approaches would in fact foster the impression that Indians
are "inferior," though this concept is rather elusive, and even if it
were descriptively accurate, it does not follow that either action
92. Id. See note 90 supra.
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would have been motivated by dislike or disrespect for Indians.
Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult to take seriously the notion
that enacting the exemption would somehow create a stronger impression of this kind than already existed when, prior to the enactment, virtually no Indians met the civil service standard.
If, however, the preferential exemption was essentially unnecessary, the notion that it was prejudically motivated becomes
more realistic, for it might then amount to a gratuitous insult to
Indians. For this reason, upon a plausible claim by the plaintiff,
the government should be required to produce evidence sufficient
to establish that the social problem to which the preference is addressed is real and that its choice of a racial classification to redress this problem was based on genuine considerations
suggesting the classification's efficacy.
Given the relative weakness of the inference of prejudice generated by facially benign Morton-type preferences, the burden upon
the government is not and should not be very onerous. All that
the government should be obliged to demonstrate is the existence
of a credible factual basis for its claimed nonprejudiced goal and
for the racial means used to pursue this goal. If it cannot establish
facts on the basis of which a reasonable person would conclude
that the problem to which the classification was allegedly addressed can fairly be regarded as real, the court should find that
the claimed goal is not credible and, absent some other persuasive explanation, hold that the inference of prejudice, though
weak, has not been overcome. For example, in Morton, the government could have sustained this part of its burden by coming
forward with credible evidence of problems with the former BIA
system among which was the relative absence of Indian personnel in the BIA.
Similarly, if the government cannot also show a credible factual
basis for choosing a racial means to pursue this goal, the court
should find that the weak inference of prejudice has not been dispelled. The government should be able to discharge this burden
with evidence far short of that which would be required to establish that the classification was a "necessary means." Given the
relative weakness of the inference of prejudice to which a
Morton-like preference itself gives rise, the probative value of evidence bearing upon alternative means is dependent on the extent
to which such means would have significantly frustrated accomplishing the claimed goal and/or entailed costs or other policy
tradeoffs that were not produced by the racial means actually
used. To the extent that possible alternative means would have
made accomplishing the claimed racially benign goal significantly
1084
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less likely or more remote, and/or would have entailed significantly increased costs or unwanted policy effects, these alternatives are not "reasonably available" in any sense that is probative
of motivation. With respect to such means, the probable reason
that they were not used was goal frustration, increased costs, or
unwanted policy effects rather than racial prejudice.
Thus, in Morton, for example, the government should have
been able to discharge its burden of establishing a factual basis
for the racial preference by credible evidence that without exemption from the civil service requirements, Indian representation in the BIA would not have increased significantly during the
near future. This proof, together with that establishing the factual
basis for the goal and demonstrating the preference's consistent
historical context and legislative history, would have provided
ample circumstantial evidence supporting the claim that the preference was employed to increase BIA responsiveness to Indians
rather than to express anti-white or anti-Indian prejudice.
If the plaintiff believes that other reasonably available and nonracial means can accomplish the benign goal and that the government's failure to use them supports an inference of prejudice, he
should be obliged to state what these means are and to produce
some evidence supporting their reasonable availability. At this
point, the government should be obliged to show that they are not
reasonably available. The ease with which the government will be
able to discharge this burden depends, not surprisingly, on the
degree to which prejudiced motivation is a real possibility. If, for
example, the plaintiff claims that the government might have increased compensatory education for Indian students so that later
generations would perform more competently on civil service examinations, the government need only point out that this action
would obviously delay accomplishing its goal. Presumably, the
government would not find it much more difficult to show, for example, that a credible factual basis exists for believing that "alternatives" like simply abolishing the civil service system for all BIA
hiring either would not significantly increase Indian representation on the BIA or would entail unwanted effects, or both.
Measured by these standards, most university racially preferential admissions programs would be upheld. With respect to the
law schools, for example, the point of racially preferential programs is to make it possible for blacks and members of other minority groups that have been systematically discriminated against
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in the past to gain entrance to law school and consequently to the
bar. The claimed goals of this racial integration are many, for example: opening legal education and the legal system to formerly
excluded viewpoints and subordinated interests; breaking down
stereotypic personal attitudes that feed racial prejudice in lawyers and judges; increasing minority group access to positions of
power commonly open to lawyers; increasing the supply of minority lawyers for minority clients who may feel greater confidence
in members of their own race; helping these racial groups more
generally by, for example, providing role models for children and
leaders and spokesmen for the groups.
There is little question but that far fewer members of these
groups would be admitted to law schools and hence to the bar
without preferential treatment. For example, as a result of preferential programs, roughly five percent of law students admitted to
the fall, 1976, entering class nationally were black.93 The best
available data suggests that the black admission rate without
preferences would at best be forty percent of this, and this is a
very optimistic assessment.94 Nor is there any question, therefore,
that blacks, who in 1970 comprised roughly seventeen percent of
the population and less than two percent of the membership of
the bar,95 would be severely underrepresented in the bar without
preferences.
It seems equally clear that there are no realistic alternative
ways of accomplishing the goals of preferences. The most commonly discussed alternative, a general program for the disadvantaged, if administered on the same scale as current racial
programs but in a racially neutral way, would result in far fewer
minority admissions. Because economically disadvantaged whites
would often outrank minority group members on the admission
93. In 1976, 1700 out of a total of 43,000 students admitted to ABA accredited law
schools were black. F. Evans, Applications and Admissions to ABA Accredited
Law Schools: An Analysis of National Data for the Class Entering in the Fall 1976,
at 39 (Law School Admission Council 1977), cited in Brief Amicus Curiae for the
Association of American Law Schools in Support of Petitioner at 27-28, Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.
granted,429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811).
94. The acceptance rates for whites for each LSAT-GPA combination applied to
black applicants would reduce the number of black students accepted to no more
than 700. Moreover, few, if any, black students would be admitted to the nation's
more prestigious law schools, and the 700 figure assumes that blacks could afford
to pay private tuitions. Id. at 44, discussed in Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association of American Law Schools in Support of Petitioner at 28, 30, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.
granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977) (No. 76-811).
95. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Detailed Occupation of
Employed Persons by Race and Sex: 1970, in 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, DETAMED CHARACTERISTICS, UnTED STATES SuzaARY 1-739 (1973).
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criteria, it is very likely that a "disadvantaged" program would
have to be at least three times larger (and perhaps eight or nine
times larger) than current programs to produce the same minority representation. 96 Other alternatives would fare no better. Simply abandoning the normal admission criteria, for example, would
97
cause a significant decline in the ability of future bar members.
In sum, racially preferential law school programs can be credibly shown to serve important nonprejudiced racial goals and a
clear factual basis can be established for the choice of a racial
means to pursue these goals. Given this showing, no inference of
prejudiced motivation is warranted.98
If the terms of a facially benign classification give reason for
greater suspicion of prejudice against the apparently benefitted
group than did those in Morton, or if the plaintiff produces evidence to this effect, the court should scrutinize the classification
even more carefully. Perhaps the most troublesome evidence of
this character is that suggesting that the classification produces
or increases racial separation from whites. Evidence of this sort
might appear on the face of an apparently benign classification, as
for example a minority restrictive racial "quota"; it may simply be
admitted by the government, or the plaintiff might come forward
with evidence demonstrating that the classification produces a
segregatory effect.
No magical solution exists to cases of this sort. Each must be
decided on its facts. In some the action will clearly be either be96. While approximately two-thirds of all disadvantaged families are white, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Money Income and Poverty Status

of Families and Persons in the United States: 1975 and 1974 Revisions (Advance
Report), in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SER. No. P-60, No. 103 (1976), current

data suggest that 90% of students admitted under such a disadvantaged special
admissions program would be non-minority. F. Evans, Applications and Admissions to ABA Accredited Law Schools: An Analysis of National Data for the Class
Entering in the Fall 1976, at 62 (Law School Admission Council 1977). Cf.
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in HigherEducation:PoliticalResponsibility and the
JudicialRole, 42 U. CHL L. REV. 653, 690 (1975) (suggesting that minorities comprise a disproportionate number of disadvantaged persons and thus would benefit
from such a program).
97. The normal admission criteria of LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA are
accurate predictions of law school performance, see 1-2 LAw SCHOOL ADm SSION
COUNCIL, REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH (1976); Linn, Test Bias and the
Prediction of Grades in Law School, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 293 (1975). No better

predictors are known, and their abandonment would thus produce less able law
students.
98. On the question whether racial preferences are therefore constitutional, see
note 1 supra.
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nignly or prejudicially motivated. Other cases, as for example
those involving so-called tipping point quotas in housing that allegedly are designed to promote or maintain integration, probably
present among the most difficult problems in racial equal protection law.
A racial quota, ratio, or percentage guideline-all of which are
actually the same-is nothing more than a method of giving practical administrative meaning to goals, and the important question
here is whether the goals are racially benign or prejudiced. A racial quota, like any other racial classification, should trigger the
necessary to a compelling goal rule of evidence only when it is
symptomatic of prejudice or singles out a minority racial group
for clear disadvantage. Many racial quotas will have neither of
these characteristics.
When a quota is used in connection with a racial classification
that eliminates or reduces some qualification that had previously
substantially limited minority group participation in the program
at issue-for example, the Indian employment preference in
Morton-the government should usually have little difficulty establishing benign motivation. If the challenged classification is
otherwise consistent with benign motivation, evidence that the
quota produces a movement from little toward racially proportionate minority participation should help significantly in substantiating the claim of benign motivation. In this situation, the
quota is being used simply to give practical meaning to the benign goal and can fairly be characterized as integrationist.
A quota is similarly supportive of a benign motivation claim if it
results in racially proportionate representation and if no other evidence exists to suggest possible prejudice, as, for example, proof
that the quota was adopted to replace some qualification system
that had previously relatively advantaged blacks. Insofar as
prejudiced motivation is concerned, such a quota is no more probative than is a random selection system. Indeed, as between
blacks and whites, random choice is itself a form of quota, given
the statistical probability that it will produce a participation rate
proportionate to the black-white ratio in the relevant jurisdiction
(as in jury selection) or in the applicant pool (as in the distribution of largesse).
The black-white participation rate yielded by random selection
or by an explicit proportional representation quota can be characterized as "disadvantaging" blacks, for these devices limit their
participation in whichever benefit is being distributed to their
proportionate share of the relevant population. However, these
devices are not the kinds of "singling out for clear disadvantage"
1088
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that trigger the necessary to a compelling goal rule of evidence,
because any supposed disadvantage is symmetrically imposed
upon whites by virtue of the proportionate limitation on their participation. Absent some other evidence, the only inference about
racial motivation that can sensibly be drawn from such a proportionate advantage-disadvantage quota is the perfectly obvious one
that it was designed to distribute costs and benefits equally
among races, perhaps as a means of assuring nondiscrimination
in administration.
For similar reasons, no suspicion of prejudice is warranted by
the decision of a local school board (not found to have engaged in
prior purposeful segregation) to adopt a racially based student assignment system that demonstrably moves each school in the district toward a black-white ratio closer to that of the district as a
whole than does the existing neighborhood residency or other
system. So long as the movement is in the direction of racially
proportionate representation, the only inference warranted is that
the plan was adopted for the benign goal of racial integration. 99
Racial quotas become potentially much more troublesome in either of two situations: first, when the program in connection with
which the quota is used involves assigning people to places or
groups and the quota results in concentrations of minority group
members that significantly exceed their proportionate share of
the relevant population; and second, when the quota either represents a step toward a minority participation rate that is less close
to the minority's proportion of the relevant population than that
produced by the existing scheme, or, in some circumstances,
when the quota simply reduces minority participation. Quotas of
the first sort suggest a motive of relative racial segregation; quotas of the second sort indicate a motive to disqualify minority
group members at a proportionately greater rate than others.
Whether the government will be able to bear the burden of
proving that such quotas were not motivated by racial prejudice
depends, in the first instance, on the confidence with which a
99. This is the reason, though not articulated as such, that the Supreme Court
could approve voluntary school integration as easily as it did in dicta in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971), and why other courts
also have approved such programs. E.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 111. 2d 593,
237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d
729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193,
199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
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court can find that the challenged action is either symptomatic of
racial prejudice or singles out the racial group for clear disadvantage. To the extent that neither of these characterizations is fair,
the government's chance of disproving prejudiced motivation increases. However, as it becomes clearer that these characterizations may be fair, the government's burden of proof should be
increased to a point where it at least approximates the necessary
to a compelling goal standard.
Consider, for example, last Term's decision in United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey.OO This case involved a challenge to a New York state redistricting plan, enacted
in order to comply with section 5 of the federal Voting Rights
Act.1l0 Several New York counties became subject to the Act because they used a literacy test during November, 1968, and because fewer than fifty percent of the residents voted in that year's
presidential election. New York's first attempt to secure approval
of a revised districting plan failed, the Attorney General in 1974
concluding about certain districts in Kings County that the state
had not met its burden under the Act "to demonstrate that the redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the
right to vote by reason of race or color."10 2 New York thereafter
revised this redistricting plan, in substance increasing the nonwhite majorities in several of the districts at issue so that the
smallest nonwhite majority in any district was sixty-five percent.
Among the communities affected by these revisions was the Williamsburgh area, where 30,000 Hasidic Jews lived. In order to attain the sixty-five percent nonwhite majority for this area, part of
the white population, including a portion of the Hasidic community, was reassigned to an adjoining district.
The plaintiff, as in Morton, claimed only anti-white discrimination, although parts of the discussions in some of the opinions are
equally relevant to discrimination against nonwhites (blacks and
Puerto Ricans) or Jews. Neither the plurality opinion nor the concurrence by Justices Powell and Stewart mentioned the suspect
classification doctrine. The plurality upheld the plan on the narrow ground that it did not violate the "non-retrogression" principle previously held constitutional with respect to the Voting
Rights Act in Beer v. United Statesl0 3 and on the broader ground
that, though the government had plainly used race in a purposeful manner, "its plan represented no racial slur or stigma
100. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).

101. Voting Rights Act of 1964, § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1970).
102. 430 U.S. at 150.
103. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
abridgement of the right to vote on account of race within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment."10 4 Justices Stewart and
Powell concurred in the plurality judgment, first asserting in a
manner reminiscent of Morton that the admitted assignment of
voters to districts on the basis of their race was somehow not a
racial classification and thereafter finding the plan constitutionally unobjectionable because it was not adopted "with the invidi05
ous purpose of discriminating against white voters.'
Justice Brennan concurred only in the plurality's narrow
ground of decision, noting that if the Supreme Court "were
presented with a classification . .. that effectively downgraded
minority participation in the franchise, ... we promptly would

characterize the resort to race as 'suspect' and prohibit its use."106
Under such circumstances, the plan would not necessarily be
saved by the fact that its effect was to confer on racial blocs the
ability to elect a number of legislators proportionate to its percentage of the population because "the segregation of voters into
'separate but equal' blocs still might have the intent or effect of
diluting the voting power of minority voters.' 0 7 For example, a
measure purportedly aimed at achieving racially proportionate
representation might really be designed to segregate a minority in
order to frustrate "its potentially successful efforts at coalition
building across racial lines.' 08
Both the complete avoidance by the plurality and Powell-Stewart concurrence of any mention of the suspect classification doctrine and Brennan's observations concerning the doctrine were
unjustified. The admittedly racial districting plan should have
been (and was) carefully reviewed by the Supreme Court, but because the plan was not symptomatic of prejudice and did not single out a minority racial group for obvious or clear disadvantage,
the government should have been permitted to prove its nonprejudiced motivation by evidence other than by that which would
qualify under the necessary to a compelling goal rule. This point
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

430 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 169-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 172-73.
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seems to be the one that both the plurality and the Powell-Stewart concurrence are making, though in a roundabout fashion.
By comparison, Justice Brennan quite rightly calls attention to
a troublesome feature of the case-the segregatory quota-but his
opinion misperceives the evidentiary function of the suspect classification doctrine. He appears to believe that finding a classification "suspect" is equivalent to holding it unconstitutional. This
mistaken premise led him to believe that if the Supreme Court
were to designate a racial classification "benign," it in effect
would "exempt" the classification from close review. This view is
incorrect, for no safe, reliable way exists by which the Supreme
Court can decide whether a classification is benign in advance of
the evidentiary scrutiny triggered by the suspect classification
doctrine. In other words, the fact that a classification is benign is
a finding that can follow only after close evidentiary scrutiny; it is
not some sort of preliminary determination that serves to exempt
the classification from such scrutiny.
Of course, it does not follow that the necessary to a compelling
goal standard was the appropriate evidentiary burden to impose
on the government. The plan plainly resulted in several districts
having significant concentrations of nonwhites relative to the nonwhite population of the county as a whole. However, that which
the government moved was not people but rather a boundary
line-one the function of which was to allocate political power,
not governmental or private sector goods or services. The action
did not carry any connotation of separating the races or providing
separate facilities or services, and therefore it was not culturally
symptomatic of prejudice. Nor, quite obviously, did it result in a
clear disadvantage to nonwhites. Whether nonwhite interests are
better represented by having minorities in many districts or majorities in a few and minorities in a few is at best an unclear matter of speculation. Such evidence as existed of the plan's effects
did not support an inference that it disadvantaged nonwhites in
this sense or that it was motivated by prejudice against either
nonwhites or whites.
The Voting Rights Act provision relating to localities with literacy tests and low electoral participation plainly and demonstrably
addressed a genuine social problem. Because a major part of
this problem was the effective disenfranchisement or underrepresentation of nonwhites, whether deliberate or not, using racial criteria in remedying violations is effective in pursuing the
goal of fair representation for nonwhites. The probability that
anti-white prejudice played a role in the passage of the Voting
Rights Act is no greater than in predominately white Congress's
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enactment of any legislation. The Attorney General's review resulting in rejection of the first plan and formulation of the second
appears rather clearly to have been animated not by prejudice
against whites or nonwhites, but rather by concern that the latter
be fairly represented. The plan resulted in white majorities in
seventy percent of the districts in the county, although the
countywide population was only sixty-five percent white-an effect that hardly supports an inference of anti-white prejudice, a
violation of the Reynolds v. SimsL0 9 principles, or given the smallness of the disparity and other evidence in the case, an inference
of prejudice against nonwhites. Moreover, the plan did not result
in nonwhite concentrations so extreme as to suggest either an attempt at blocking minority nonwhite-white coalitions or antiwhite prejudice: The sixty-five percent majority nonwhite figure
overexaggerated nonwhite voting majorities in that it represented
percentages of total rather than voting-age populations, which in
some districts were probably only slightly in excess of fifty percent." 0
The most troublesome feature of the U.J.O. case was the possibility, apparently not pleaded by the plaintiff and not seriously
addressed by the Supreme Court, that the districting plan was
caused by prejudice against the Hasidic Jews. The question was
not simply whether any plan that resulted in this distribution of
white and nonwhite electors was motivated by prejudice against
any group, but whether this particular plan was so motivated. The
county districting authorities obviously were aware of the plan's
effect on the Hasidic community. Nevertheless, this awareness
alone does not establish prejudiced motivation, and, of course, because of the potential for coalition voting, it is no clearer without
further evidence that the Hasidic Jews were "disadvantaged" by
the districting than it is that nonwhites would be politically better
off spread among many or concentrated in few districts. However,
had further evidence been developed by the plaintiff, this feature
of the case could have become extremely troublesome. Some suggestion exists that nonwhite majority districts could equally as
well have been achieved without impinging upon the interests of
any discrete racial or ethnic group other than "whites.""' Had the
plaintiff proved this point and also submitted some credible evi109. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
110. 430 U.S. at 164.
111. Id. at 181-82 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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dence suggesting that at least as to Hasidic Jews interests were
less well protected by the split than by concentration, the inference might have been warranted that this particular plan was
causally affected by prejudice against them. That this inference
might have been warranted will become clearer when we consider
covert discrimination.
In regard to the issue of prejudice against blacks or nonwhites,
some kinds of quotas can be considerably more problematic than
that challenged in U.J.O. Determining whether a so-called tipping
point housing quota was motivated by such prejudice could be extremely difficult. Such a quota can result in the denial of housing
to blacks in order to prevent an apartment complex (or perhaps
neighborhood?) from reaching a supposed "tipping point" and
eventually becoming all black.1 2 Although complete discussion of
this complicated problem is beyond this article's scope, a few
3
points can be noted here."
All other things being equal, tipping point and related kinds of
racial quotas become more probative of prejudice as the discrepancy increases between the quota percentage of blacks (or other
racial groups) and their percentage in the applicant pool. Of
course, if no discrepancy exists, the quota meets the random
choice or proportionate representation model and can fairly be
characterized as integrationist and unobjectionable, for it imposes
advantages and disadvantages in equal measure on affected racial
groups. As the discrepancy increases, the quota becomes more
problematic because the discrepancy is a potential measure of
both segregation and disadvantage.
If, on the one hand, blacks comprise ten percent of the applicant pool and eighty percent in the quota, the program has symptoms of racially prejudiced segregation. If, on the other hand,
blacks comprise eighty percent of the applicant pool and ten percent in the quota, the program seems both to single out and to
segregate blacks to their clear disadvantage. Discrepancies of this
magnitude are functionally very close to the kinds of racial classifications that have triggered the necessary to a compelling goal
rule of evidence and should probably be struck down unless the
112. E.g., Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 344 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)

(preliminary injunction issued), 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y.) (order), rev'd, 484
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).

113. For an interesting discussion of both the empirical constitutional issues involved in housing quotas see Ackerman, Integrationfor Subsidized Housing and
the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls,26 STAN. L REV. 245 (1974). The most

perceptive treatment of this general problem area is Bittker, The Case of the
Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE IJ.

(1962).
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government establishes by clear and convincing evidence (or
some similar minimal standard) that prejudice played no role in
the program's promulgation. As the discrepancy narrows, its probative value on prejudice diminishes, though it should nevertheless be carefully reviewed, with the government bearing the
burden of proof. If, for example, blacks comprise sixty percent of
the applicant pool and fifty percent in the quota, factual substantiation by the government of the reality of the tipping point projection, combined perhaps with evidence of relevant behavior by
the housing authority incompatible with prejudice and a reliable
administrative record showing notice to and participation by affected groups and consistent with an integration goal, should
probably suffice to disprove prejudice.
One final indicium of prejudice against a group apparently
benefitted by a facially benign racial classification deserves special note. In the terms of the classification itself, perhaps the most
suspicious item of evidence that might appear would be a
mandatory requirement that all members of the apparently
benefitted racial group participate in or take advantage of the
preferential system. Imagine, for example, that taking advantage
of the exemption from competitive civil service requirements was
made a condition of BIA employment of Indians, so that Indians
were not permitted to compete with others for jobs even if they
wished. A "preference" of this sort seems gratuitously demeaning,
in that the foreclosure of individual choice borders on a racially
paternalistic lack of respect for group members as competent
choice-makers. For this reason, such a mandatorily segregated applicant pool gives rise to a considerably stronger inference of
prejudiced motivation than does a Morton-type preference. When,
as here, something about the terms of the facially benign classification leads to a heightened suspicion of prejudice against any
group, the government should be required to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that these terms were not motivated by
prejudice.
In this regard we should emphasize that a mandatory racial
classification, even if apparently benign, should rarely, if ever, be
sustained on the basis that its goal is protecting members of the
singled-out racial group from themselves. For example, a government explanation of a hypothetical mandatory BIA civil service
exemption in Morton as designed to protect Indians from "wasting their own time" or "feeling disappointed" when the vast ma-
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jority of them fail the exam should be regarded as a concession
that the suspicious terms were motivated by racial prejudice. This
form of racial paternalism is part and parcel of the ideology of racial prejudice, and for this reason it merits unequivocal condemnation.
Although the point seems obvious, it is worth noting expressly
that because racial paternalism is a prejudiced goal, a racial classification that is facially presumptively prejudiced cannot be
transformed into a "benign" classification by the sheer manipulation of words. Thus, a so-called "efficient" racial classification, say
a government ban on the employment of blacks in certain private
occupations or government positions, singles out a minority racial
group for clear disadvantage and under the motive theory proposed here is therefore presumptively prejudiced.11 4 Such a classification should be held unconstitutional unless the strong
presumption of prejudice is dispelled by proof that the classification was necessary to a compelling goal. Evidence that members
of the disfavored group were significantly less likely than others
to perform well on the job would not satisfy this proof standard
because it would not be persuasive enough to dispel the experientially rooted presumption of prejudice. Racial stereotyping is
only a symptom of the underlying attitude of racial disrespect or
dislike, and the fact that statistical evidence shows that the stereotype has some factual basis does not and cannot alone establish
with sufficient reliability that it was the factual basis rather than
the attitude of dislike or disrespect that prompted the governmental action. Nor can the government escape this analysis by claiming that the hypothetical employment ban is a "benign"
classification because motivated by the goal of protecting blacks
against job disappointments or giving them "realistic" career aspirations. Such a claim is at best a concession of paternalistically
racist motivation.
If a racially paternalistic goal is ever to be considered nonprejudiced-and the proposition is by no means clear that it ever
should-its acceptance should be limited to situations in which
both the racial classification itself can be shown to have been enacted in pursuit of nonprejudiced goals and the mandatory paternalistic feature of it concerns a subject about which paternalism
is widely regarded as morally proper irrespective of race. An example of such a situation is a program of mandatory physical ex114. It is for this reason that "efficient" racial classifications are very different
from benign classifications, contrary to Professor Posner's assumption. See Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionalityof PreferentialTreatment of RacialMinorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
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aminations established for members of a particular race in an
effort to detect a serious, though noncommunicable, racially
linked disease like sickle-cell anemia; however, because the possibility of paternalistically racist motivation is present even here,
the government should bear the burden of proving through reliable evidence that a voluntary program would be inadequate."5s
EvidentiaryInferences and the Concept of Institutional
Motivation
Having supplied some concrete illustrations of the racially
prejudiced motivation theory in operation in cases involving
racially overt actions, we can now return to the logically prior
question of whether one can meaningfully talk about an institution's motivation and, if so, the extent to which its motivation is
evidentially ascertainable. Asking a question about a group's motives for taking an action is neither more nor less meaningful than
is asking about an individual's motives. We commonly rely most
heavily on the same kind of evidence in determining individual
and group motives -circumstantial evidence from which we infer
which of two or more motives was the more probable. Drawing
inferences from circumstantial evidence about the motivation of
either individuals or groups is not always an easy task intellectually, and when the evidence supports equally an inference of
either innocent or illicit motivation, the crucial issue is who has
the burden of proof, for the other party is entitled to the benefit of
doubt.
The kind of evidence that is most readily available and often
used in adjudicating whether an institution's action was racially
prejudiced is evidence of the behavior of the institution whose
members took the action the plaintiff is challenging. Such evidence supports an inference of the institutional motivation of a
multi-membered group to the same extent it would individual motivation if the government authority at issue consisted of a single
person, like a commissioner. We shall call circumstantial proof of
this type evidence of specific institutional behavior. Two other
kinds of evidence might be more problematic-generic institutional behavior and individual member motivation. The first does
not appear to concern the courts but deserves at least brief comment, for it is a kind of evidence that, strictly speaking, is not
115. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text infra.

1097

available in connection with individual, non-institutional motivation. Rather it is available in connection with institutions, for they
have generic identitites (or legal existences) that at any point in
time temporally transcend their specific membership. The second
kind of evidence has been of considerable concern to the courts,
basically because the statements of a member of an institution
are often very probative evidence of his own motivation but less
probative of that of a multi-membered institution.116
The first evidentiary category consists of evidence of specific institutional behavior from which a circumstantial inference of institutional motivation may be drawn. It includes, most
prominently: (1) overtly racial rules or regulations that may (a)
be symptomatic of prejudice, (b) single out a minority racial
group or groups for clear disadvantage, or (c) have neither of
these racial characteristics, or share one or the other to some incomplete extent;"17 (2) evidence that the action significantly disadvantages a member or members of a minority racial group
relative to others within the relevant population;118(3) an explantion of the purportedly innocent goals of the challenged action
that is sufficiently contextually peculiar to warrant disbelief119
(4) evidence that the action's purportedly innocent goals could
have been accomplished by reasonably available alternative
means with a significantly less racially disproportionate effect; l20
(5) judicial or administrative decisions that assign race as one of
the grounds of decision; (6) an institutional admission, as for oxample a preamble of legislation racially neutral on its face that recites a racial purpose or an admission by counsel representing
the institution that took the challenged action;121 (7) evidence of a
contextual peculiarity in the process that led to the challenged actions, as, for example, the omission of a required or customary
hearing;, 2 2 (8) evidence that the specific membership institution
has previously been found to have engaged in racially prejudiced
actions;' 2 3 (9) evidence of a social-political background or context
116. See notes 132-40 and accompanying text infra.
117. See notes 48-115 and accompanying text supra.
118. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
119. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), discussed in text accompanying note 161 infra; Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
120. E.g., United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 538 n.13, 540 n.20, 542-43 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). See notes 166-74 and accompanying text
infra.
121. E.g., Hawkins v. North C. State Bd. of Educ., 11 RACE RE.L.L REP. 745
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1966). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (discrimination
against aliens apparent on face of legislation).
122. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 267 (1977).
123. The courts do not seem to distinguish cases on the basis of whether the
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suggestive of racial prejudice;124 (10) evidence of the data and
arguments, whether by outsiders or members, presented to the
institution during the information-gathering and deliberative processes that led to the action. 2 5
To repeat, these evidentiary items of specific institutional behavior have the common characteristic that their probative value
on the question of racially prejudiced motivation is not affected
by the fact that the action was taken by a group rather than by an
individual.126 A significant difference also exists among evidentiary items in this category-one that we shall see has important
implications for the process of proving the causation issue: Items
(3) and (4) when offered in conjunction with item (1) or (2) function to create inferences that discredit claims that the action was
motivated by racially innocent considerations, while items (5)
through (10) create inferences that racial prejudice was among
27
the factors motivating the decision.1
We have already considered several kinds of racially overt rules
and regulations.128 Given our discussion of the reasons that some
racially overt rules create strong inferences of racially prejudiced
action and others do not, the fact should be obvious that whether
the classification was promulgated by a single- or multi-member
authority is simply irrelevant. Perhaps less obviously, the same is
true of governmental actions other than racially overt rules so
long as the evidence of motivation is confined to items (2)
through (10).
This point can be illustrated by recalling our earlier hypothetical involving a zoning board decision denying a variance for a lowincome housing project.129 There we made the unrealistic asprior official action was taken by the same or by different members. In Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), 21 different individuals had served on the
seven-member school board during the period at issue. See Case Comment, Keyes
v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. C.R.CJ., L. REV. 124, 140-41 (1974). See generally Note, Reading the Mind of the School
Board;-Segregative Intent and the De Facto/DeJure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317
(1976). See notes 130-31 & 167-72 and accompanying text infra.
124. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
125. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 268 (1977).

126. Professor Brest also makes this point. An Approach, supra note 3, at 11923.
127. See text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.

'128. See notes 48-115 and accompanying text supra.
129. In many states, a variance would not be available for a significant zoning
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sumption that the board's motives were fully known: The court
knew that the board acted because it wanted to exclude the black
population that the project was predicted to attract. It also knew
that the board would have denied a variance to any use of property other than for single-family dwellings even apart from the
race of those affected. Let us now eliminate this artificial assumption of knowledge and consider the evidence on the basis of
which a real lawsuit might be adjudicated.
Assume that a plaintiff developer proves that it requested the
variance and that the request was denied, that blacks comprise
twenty percent of the population of the metropolitan area in
which the town at issue is located but only two percent of the
town itself, and that of those in the metropolitan area who would
have been eligible for the low-income project, fifty percent are
black. This evidence alone, as We shall discuss later, does not warrant the inference that the variance denial was racially
prejudiced. If, in an attempt to present additional evidence warranting this inference, the plaintiff offers any of the kinds of evidence included in the first category (or the court on its own
concludes that the government's innocent explanation is incredible), the evidence will be equally probative (or nonprobative) of
motivation whether we assume that the zoning authority was a
multi-member board or a single commissioner.
Suppose, for example, that the reason given for the denial and
the one argued in court is that the project would be inconsistent
with the neighborhood's essentially single-family character, that
the plaintiff proves that twenty percent of the families in the area
live in apartments, and that this percentage has increased markedly during the past three years because the same members of
the zoning authority granted four successive variances for commercial apartment complexes of the same general size as the proposed project. This evidence may be inconclusive on the
motivation issue, but its inconclusivity is not a function of whether the authority is single- or multi-membered.
The difficulty is that the evidence, given the assigned and argued reason for the authority's decision, is not necessarily inconsistent with a goal of preserving the neighborhood's "essentially"
single-family character-that is, the evidence does not realistically exclude the possibility that the authority decided that a
exception of this sort. See, e.g., Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County
of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974). The jurisdiction
might be able to provide for such exception by adopting a conditional use permit
type of ordinance, typically entailing greater procedural checks and more extensive consideration.
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maximum population of twenty percent apartment dwellers
would not alter the neighborhood's essential character but that
greater percentages would. The probability that this was the authority's real reason for denial does not, however, depend on
whether the decision was made by a single- or multi-member
board. If by a single-member board, the real reason for decision
was possibly the innocent one claimed, or the exclusion of blacks,
or both. If by a multi-member board, any of these three might be
the real reason that each member voted to deny the variance. The
question of how to resolve the circumstantial inference raised by
the evidence is the same whatever the numerical membership of
the boarc How likely is it that a zoning board member would
have denied the variance in order to preserve the neighborhood's
essential character, irrespective of racial prejudice? If a court determined that this explanation of a board member's behavior was
not at all likely, it would find the board's decision unconstitutional; if, as is more probable, the court believed that a zoning
commission would as likely as not act in this racially innocent
way, it would find the board's decisions constitutionally permissible. The same would be true if we constructed the hypothetical so
as to increase the likelihood that the authority acted-and that a
court would find that it acted--out of racial prejudice. The authority's numerical composition would be equally irrelevant, for example, if the plaintiff, confronted with the same defense we
assumed above, were able to prove that ninety percent of the famlies in the neighborhood lived in apartments for which a succession of variances had been granted, or that while only twenty
percent lived in such apartments at the time of denial, the same
membership board, during the six months following the denial,
granted five more variances for commercial apartments, raising
the projected total to fifty percent.
Whether the authority was single- or multi-member is irrelevant on the evidence because in the case no direct proof was offered of anyone's state of mind. Instead, the evidence went
entirely to specific institutional behavior, and no reason exists to
suppose that its probative value differs among different members
of a zoning board. The inferences that the plaintiff is asking the
court to draw from this evidence are: (1) that a reasonable person
(or zoning commissioner) would not have taien the action for the
alleged innocent reason; and (2) that because (a) no other innocent reason has been suggested, (b) the action produces an effect
1101

that significantly harms blacks relative to whites, and (c) it is
common knowledge that whites often act out of racial prejudice
against blacks, the decision of each member who voted for the denial was more probably than not caused by racial prejudice.
The institution's numerical composition remains irrelevant so
long as any supplemental proof consists of evidence relevant to
the behavior of the specific membership that took the challenged
action. Suppose, for example, that the board gave as reasons for
the denial both the single-family character of the neighborhood
and a desire to keep blacks out. The reasons assigned by the
board for its action are evidence of its institutional motivation,
equally probative whether it has one or one hundred members.
Or assume instead that the plaintiff is able to supplement any of
the three previously mentioned proof scenarios concerning the
plausibility of the single-family dwelling explanation with evidence that several groups held newspaper-covered demonstrations to protest opening the community to blacks, that several
opponents of the variance testified to this, effect at the hearing,
and that the zoning authority neglected to request a staff report
on the merits of the variance as it always had done on other variance matters. The inferences that the plaintiff seeks to have the
court draw from such evidence are that a reasonable person
would probably be swayed to some extent by community excitement and testimony and would probably not fail to follow a customary procedure unless he were afraid of what following that
procedure would reveal or unless he had already decided the issue. If these inferences are at all warranted, and they certainly
seem to be, they are equally warranted as to all the board members who voted against the variance.
Suppose, however, that plaintiff proposes to introduce evidence
that the city's "generic" zoning board, over a ten-year period during which time the membership changed substantially, has on two
occasions been judicially determined to have engaged in racially
prejudiced zoning practices. Or consider evidence offered by a
black recently denied a business license that the generic institution during a ten-year period has engaged in anti-black licensing
practices explainable on no plausible ground other than racial
prejudice. Or consider evidence offered to discredit a claimed racially innocent reason (like tardiness) for a public institution's
having terminated the employment of a black, offered to prove
that over a ten-year period the generic institution has not fired
whites who were similarly tardy.
These are examples of behavioral evidence relevant to the generic institution the current membership of which took the chal1102
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lenged action and the institutional motivation of which is now at
issue. The courts appear to receive and often rely heavily upon
such evidence, regardless of the fact that the individuals who now
comprise the challenged institution may be different from those
30
who took the action offered in evidence.
Evidence of this sort is related to that of contemporaneous social-political conditions that may shed light on the motivation
with which a specific membership institution acted. Its relevance
and probative value rest on the fact that institutions usually reflect and respond to the socially and politically dominant values
in the community that they serve, and indeed, these values will
often be effectively institutionalized in the unchanging bureaucracy that often comprises the institution's staff. A change in institutional membership might, of course, herald a change in goals
and policies; but when a newly chosen membership engages in
actions that bear some hallmarks of racial prejudice, the fact that
the generic institution has historically engaged in similar practices is relevant and probative of the new membership's motivation because we know that institutions can rarely escape the tug
of basic community, constituent, and bureaucratic forces.131
The final kind of evidence that is sometimes available to prove
institutional motivation is evidence of individual member motivation, as if, for instance, one of the five members of our zoning
board who voted to deny the variance said at the time that he acted to keep blacks out of the community. Evidence of this sort has
been of significant concern to the courts. For example, in Washington v. Davis,132 the Supreme Court presumably meant to call
attention to this problem in its "explanation" of its earlier decision in Palmer v. Thompson.IS3 Palmer involved a challenge to a
Jackson, Mississippi, city council decision to close the city's public swimming pools rather than to desegregate them as required
by a court order. Palmer was decided several years after Griffin

130. See note 123 supra.
131. The difficult question is how a court can distinguish bona fide new and racially neutral policy choices the effects of which happen to resemble those of previous racially prejudiced actions. Sometimes the issue can be determined with
confidence through circumstantial inferences, and in closer cases the important
questions concern the allocation and level of burdens of proof, as we shall discuss
later. See notes 175-79 and accompanying text infra.
132. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
133. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).

1103

v. County School Board,134 in which the Supreme Court, upon
finding it illicitly motivated, had invalidated that county's decision to close its public schools rather than desegregate them. The
Palmer Court nonetheless refused even to entertain the argument that the Jackson swimming pool closure was unconstitutional because taken for racially impermissible motives.135 The
Washington Court explained Palmerin this fashion: "The holding
of the case was that the legitimate purposes of the ordinance-to
preserve peace and avoid deficits-were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by
racial considerations."136 While this explanation seems as opaque
as the Palmer opinion itself, apparently the Court meant to call
attention to the difference between evidence of the motivation of
an institution on the one hand and that of the individual members
of the institution on the other.
The confusion in both the Palmer decision itself and in
Washington's explanation of it is probably caused in some measure by the Court's failure to distinguish between two related but
different evidentiary questions and perhaps by an additional failure (whose consideration is beyond this article's scope) to distinguish both these questions from that of the appropriate remedy
after a violation is proven.l3 7 One evidentiary question concerns
the admissibility of different types of evidence of institutional
motivation. A second question concerns the probative value of
134. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
135. 403 U.S. at 224.

136. 426 U.S. at 243.
137. If a plaintiff proves that the provision of some public service has been terminated or otherwise warped because of racial prejudice, and the government defends, as in Palmer,essentially on the ground that the existence of private racial
prejudice would make continued or nonwarped provision of the service both extremely cost-ineffective and integration-defeating, it seems both plausible and at
least prima facie sensible to suppose that a court might properly consider these
cost considerations when framing a remedy. Thus, for example, it may be that reliable evidence might have been marshalled in Palmer to prove both that the continued operation of only some of the previously available swimming pools would
have resulted in no significant decrease in swimming opportunities available to
blacks and that white attendance at swimming pools would drop to near zero after
they were integrated. If a court were persuaded that there was a substantial factual basis for these projections, it would seem arguable that the appropriate remedy would allow the city to close half (but only half) of the pools. The same type
of considerations seem involved in a wide variety of remedy issues, as, for example, in the "white flight" projections sometimes made in connection with school
desegregation decrees. Determining what constitutes a reliable factual basis and
precisely how the projections should affect the remedy is obviously not easy; but
common sense suggests that if a reliable factual basis for projecting white flight
can be established, a court ought not simply ignore the data when framing a remedy. I should emphasize, though, that I have not fully thought through the implications of this view on remedy, and I have not attempted to grapple with the facts of
real cases to test its workability.
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different types of evidence. Both the Palmer decision and
Washington's explanation of it create what is probably the mistaken impression that evidence of the motivation of individual
members is broadly inadmissible to prove institutional motivation, rather than, as is undoubtedly true, that such evidence may
sometimes be beyond the plaintiff's power to produce because
government officers may be privileged not to testify. Moreover,
when it is available, such evidence will usually have relatively little probative value on the issue of institutional motivation.
The question of whether and to what extent members of government bodies should be privileged to refuse to testify about
their reasons for having approved or disapproved an official action is an important one, though also beyond this article's
scope.SS Rather clear signs appear in recent Supreme Court opinions that this previously sacrosanct territory may soon be at least
partially desanctified. 13 9 Perhaps the central issue is defining the
circumstances in which the power to call and cross-examine government officials is likely to be sufficiently helpful to plaintiffs to
warrant overriding the rather obvious policies supporting the testimonial privilege. Although some situations probably exist in
which cross-examination of individuals would significantly benefit plaintiffs, there are many others in which the benefit would be
marginal. Most officials called to the stand would deny that racial
prejudice played a role in their decisions and would explain their
votes as based on some racially innocent goal. The critical question would be whether the official is telling the truth, and this
question presents exactly the same inference issue that would
arise if the official did not testify but if instead counsel representing the government claimed that the same innocent goal explained the institution's actions. Thus, assessing the credibility of
testimony by a member of our hypothetical zoning board that she
voted to deny the variance because of the neighborhood's singlefamily dwelling character presents the court with exactly the
138. I am not aware of any recent systematic discussions of this question. See
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 n.18
(1977); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVDENCE §§ 2369-2372 (3d ed. 1940). Cf. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (discussing presidential immunity from judicial

process); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(holding that inquiry into mental processes of decisionmakers is usually to be
avoided); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (discussing legislators' privi-

lege to be free from arrest or civil process for speech or acts during legislative proceedings).
139. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
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same circumstantial inference issue as if she had never taken the
stand. The additional evidence generated, for example, by watching the official "back and fill" during cross-examination is probably of some incremental evidentiary value, but it is not clear
whether in the common run of cases this value warrants overriding the privilege and adding to the time and expense of trials.
The important point for our purposes is that the answer to the
question of whether the privilege should be available and, if so,
under which circumstances, should depend on the foregoing
calculus, not on any mysticisms concerning the difference between institutional and individual motivation. An institution consists of its individual members; if no privilege is available and if a
majority of those who voted for an action reveal, through either
devastating cross-examination or credible direct admissions, that
they would not have voted as they did but for racial prejudice, the
institution's actions should be held unconstitutional. To be sure, if
the privilege were eliminated, significant problems would arise in
determining how many individual members must be shown to
have acted with bad motives, whether a showing of illicit motives
on the part of key members like committee chairpeople suffices,
and so forth. These problems, although difficult, are probably not
beyond solution, and it is worth repeating for emphasis that the
spectre of a plaintiff calling fifty member-witnesses is probably
based on an overestimate of the incremental probative value of
such evidence.
The testimonial privilege of government officials is by no means
the only problem that can arise in connection with evidence of individual member motivation. Either a plaintiff or the government
may seek to introduce various kinds of out-of-court statements by
members, and presumably both sides have substantial if not complete latitude in offering in-court testimony by willing members.140 It is difficult, if not impossible, to believe that
Washington's explanation of Palmer intended to make such evidence broadly inadmissible, although it is true that such evidence--except in the case of single-member institutions-will
usually have relatively little probative force.
If a member's out-of-court admission that prejudice affected his
own decision were made in circumstances suggesting that it
might have affected the motives of other members of the institution, it would be to some extent probative of institutional motivation, though not because made by a member. If, for example, on
the day and near the place that the vote was to be taken, the
140. See note 138 supra.
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member made a public speech at a mass rally expressing his support of the pending action because it would keep blacks out, or if
he made an argument to like effect during the institution's deliberations, the statements would be circumstantial evidence of specific institutional behavior and relevant to the question whether
prejudice played a role in the decision. The first statement is evidence of the social-political context, and the second, of information or arguments provided to the institution. Had the public
speech been given under the specified circumstances by someone
who was not a member of the institution and the prejudiced argument made by a non-member witness testifying before a committee, these items of evidence would obviously be probative of the
influences that might have prompted the institution to act.
Neither becomes any less probative because made by a member.
Even statements of this candid kind, whether made by members
or non-members, will usually be of relatively little probative
value, as we shall discuss at greater length in connection with
proving causation; but such evidence is both admissible and relevant, sometimes quite probative, and in any event in close cases
could tip the scales.
Admissions by individual members not made in these kinds of
circumstances are relevant to institutional motivation only because the individual is a part of the institution and his admission
of personal prejudice therefore tells us something about his role
in the institution's action. However, such statements, as for example an out-of-court admission to a third party or willing trial testimony admitting personal prejudice, have little independent
probative value concerning institutional motivation, for one member's motivation, standing alone, provides no information about
others' motives.
Covert Discrimination:Racially DisproportionateEffects in
Conjunctionwith CircumstantialDisproofof
Innocent Goals
In cases in which the governmental action that the plaintiff attacks as racially discriminatory is not a racially overt rule, the
courts do not invoke the necessary to a compelling goal rule of evidence, and they do not employ the vocabulary of "suspiciousness." That which distinguishes overt from covert discrimination
cases is the probative value on the prejudiced motivation issue of
these different kinds of governmental actions. The terms of some
1107

racially overt rules often go far toward establishing that the action
is racist or at least that it relatively disadvantages races against
which prejudice exists. A racially overt rule is also conclusive evidence that racial considerations affected the decision process, and
the very fact that the rule is articulated in racial terms is a substantial indication that it would not have been enacted but for
these racial considerations. For these and for the other evidentiary reasons that we have discussed, even a facially benign classification should be regarded suspiciously. Other kinds of
governmental actions-for example, enacting racially neutral
rules or making discretionary administrative determinations that
do not refer to race-usually share none of these evidentiary
characteristics. For all that actions like these bespeak, racial considerations probably played no role in them, and even if they did,
the same actions might well have been taken apart from these
considerations.
For these evidentiary reasons, racially neutral rules or governmental actions are not themselves suspect. However, if the plaintiff pleads and offers evidence sufficient to warrant an inference
of prejudiced motivation, the challenged rule or action should be
regarded suspiciously and thus carefully reviewed. Whether a
challenged action should be regarded as suspicious, and if so, how
suspicious, depends on the type of action and the probative force
of the plaintiff's evidence suggesting racial prejudice. Minimally,
in any case in which the plaintiff has come forward with credible
evidence supporting an inference of racially prejudiced motivation, the court should demand of the government a more credible,
nonprejudiced explanation than would be required under the
classic version of the rational basis test applicable in run-of-themill equal protection cases, though considerably less than would
be required under the necessary to a compelling goal test. In
some circumstances an intermediate burden of proof should be
shifted to the government.
Perhaps the single most noteworthy item of evidence supporting an inference of prejudice is proof that the challenged action
produces a significant effect of proportionately disadvantaging a
racial or ethnic minority group relative to others. When the proportionate disadvantage is instead suffered by the majority white
group, an inference of anti-white prejudice will ordinarily not be
warranted without very substantial additional evidence, given the
improbability of this group's taking prejudiced actions against itself.141 In other words, the government should usually have little
difficulty proving that a measure that disproportionately disad141. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
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vantages whites was taken either for non-racial or for racially benign goals.
When, however, the plaintiff proves that the relative disadvantage is suffered by a racial or ethnic minority group, this evidence
alone gives rise to an inference of possible prejudiced motivation
sufficient to warrant careful judicial review and to require the
government to come forward with a credible, nonprejudiced explanation of the action. Evidence of disproportionate impact
alone, therefore, should be enough to support a finding of
prejudiced motivation only in the rare case in which the government .simply declines to offer any explanation of the motivation
behind the challenged action.142 However, such evidence, when
combined with evidence that circumstantially disproves any innocent goals that the government claims the challenged action pursues, is sufficient to warrant a finding that the action would not
have been taken but for prejudiced motivation.
Sometimes this circumstantial disproof might be supplied by
the government itself, as when it offers an explanation that simply is not credible. Cases involving incredible government explanations include those that have sometimes prompted claims that
the governmental action is "irrational." In other cases the government's innocent explanation may be sufficiently credible to warrant the inference that prejudice did not cause the action, and
here the burden of discrediting the government's claim falls upon
the plaintiff, except perhaps as to certain kinds of governmental
actions with respect to which a persuasive argument might be
made for shifting the burden of proving circumstantial corroboration to the government.
The principal case dealing with disproportionate effects is
Washington v. Davis.4 3 In this case plaintiffs challenged the
Washington, D.C., police force's use of a civil service examination
testing verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension.
Applicants had to pass the test, which was standard for government employment, in order to qualify for a training program that
was a prerequisite to becoming a police officer. Plaintiffs proved
that blacks failed the examination at a rate four times greater
than did whites. On the basis of this racially disproportionate ef142. On the question whether disproportionate impact alone should trigger
heightened judicial scrutiny, see note 1 supra.
143. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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fect, plaintiffs claimed that the test was unconstitutional unless
the government proved that it predicted successful job performance. Plaintiffs made "no claim of 'an intentional discrimination
or purposeful discriminatory acts.' "144
The Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' attack, characterizing
plaintiffs as arguing that governmental actions that are not racially overt but that produce racially disproportionate effects are
unconstitutional "absent a compelling justification." The Court
found such a claim unacceptable, because it "would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and
licensing statutes." 4 5
Clearly the Court properly rejected the claim it described. Less
clear is that the theory it rejected was the one the plaintiff was
proposing. 4 6 The sole fact that a governmental action produces
racially disproportionate effects is not adequately probative of racially prejudiced motivation so as to justify triggering the necessary to a compelling goal test, for experience suggests there will
often be truthful, nonprejudiced explanations of the action that
would fall short of satisfying the compelling justification standard.147 The question in such cases is whether any of these explanations is sufficiently persuasive to offset the inference of
prejudiced motivation that would otherwise arise from the disproportionate effect. The answer to this question will obviously depend upon the precise facts of the case: In which ways and to
what extent is the impact racially disproportionate, and, given the
type of governmental action at issue, how persuasive is the government's explanation?
Throughout much of its opinion in Washington and again in
Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development
Corp.,148 the Supreme Court appears to have understood all these
points very well. However, the Washington opinion does contain
some rather confusing passages. Several create, if somewhat
vaguely, the impression that a law or test that produces a disproportionate racial impact but that is neutral on its face is constitu144. Id. at 235.
145. Id. at 248.
146. For three thoughtful and provocative arguments on behalf of constitutional
approaches that sometimes would invalidate government actions on the basis of
racially disproportionate effects without regard to motivation, see Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication,
52 N.Y.U. I REv. 36 (1977); Fiss, Groupsand the EqualProtection Clause, 5 P1. &
PuB. AFF. 107 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). See note 1 supra.
147. But see note 1 supra.
148. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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149
tional so long as it has some rational basis.
If these passages were mearit to reflect anything more than the
fact that the plaintiff had not pleaded that the test was a product
of racially prejudiced motivation, they are most unfortunate. A
plaintiff whose pleading is sufficient and who proves that the action he challenges produces a significant racially disproportionate
effect should certainly not have his complaint dismissed simply
upon a finding that the challenged action satisfies the traditional
rational basis test, under which50an action is "rational" if it has
"any conceivable basis in fact."' The reason is that a showing of
significant disproportionate disadvantage to a racial minority
group, without more, gives rise to an inference that the action
may have been taken or at least maintained or continued with
knowledge that such groups would be relatively disadvantaged.
This showing alone does not establish that a goal of the action
was to disadvantage these groups or that racial prejudice otherwise affected the decision process, but it raises a possibility sufficient to oblige the government to come forward with a credible
explanation showing that the action was (or would have been)
taken quite apart from prejudice. Depending upon the type of
governmental action at issue, discharging this burden will often
be easy for the government, but sometimes it will be difficult or
impossible. In all cases, however, the government should be required to show more than that the action has some racially innocent "conceivable basis in fact" because, as anyone familiar with
this standard is aware, it can result in the validation of actions on
the basis of explanations that are virtually incredible.151

Perhaps another way of making this point is to say that it is
highly unrealistic to suppose that government entities are una-

ware of the probable racial consequences of a great many actions
that they take, particularly of those that are realistic objects of
equal protection attacks. Sometimes this awareness is a result of
149. 426 U.S. at 229, 241, 244, 246-47.
150. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Some of the more inter-

esting discussions of "rationality" analysis in constitutional law are: Gunther, The
Supreme Cour4 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Motivation, note 1
supra; Sandelow, Racial Preferencesin HigherEducation: PoliticalResponsibility
and the JudicialRole, 42 U. CmL L. REV. 653 (1975); Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality,and Equal Protection,82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
151. E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See note

150 supra.

1111

personal knowledge, as in the case of school board members who
are usually well aware of their districts' racial demography and
can hardly claim they did not know the racial consequences of locating a school at a particular place or drawing attendance area
lines in a particular fashion. At other times the awareness is a result of by now widely disseminated social science information
correlating race with other characteristics. Any professional and
probably most newspaper readers know, for example, that a
higher proportion of blacks than whites will score at the low end
of certain kinds of "intelligence" tests and will have low incomes
and that therefore actions that relatively disadvantage low test
scorers or those with low income will disproportionately disadvantage blacks relative to whites. Even a government entity that
was unaware of the racial consequences of an action at the time it
was taken will often later learn of its racial effects because either
interested groups or a plaintiff in a lawsuit will make these facts
known. Furthermore, subject to some important, if unprincipled,
exceptions that derive from state action values or related remedial limitations on the judicial role (that apply in some but far
from all cases), the government's maintenance of or refusal to
modify a law or course of action for racially prejudiced reasons
should be held to violate the process distortion and dignitary
harm norms.152
This conclusion by no means establishes that actions should or
would be held unconstitutional simply because they produce racially disproportionate effects.153 Indeed, in the vast majority of
cases, evidence of such effects alone should not lead to a finding
of unconstitutionality. Moreover, even in cases in which, on the
basis of evidence of effects alone or effects in conjunction with
other evidence, an action is held unconstitutional, nothing ineluctably follows concerning the appropriate remedy. 5 4 The point is
simply that for the law to blind itself to social reality would be
foolish, and the reality is that government entities are usually
aware of the racial effects of actions that they take. Given this reality and our national history of racial prejudice, to dispel an inference of prejudiced motivation arising from significant racially
disproportionate impact, the government's racially innocent explanation should and probably does have to be more credible
than would be required under the any conceivable basis in fact
standard.
152. See note 34 supra.
153. Compare this outcome with those that would be produced by the three theories in the articles cited in note 146 supra.
154. See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
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The traditional rational basis test is largely a sham as an independent standard of constitutional review or as a prerequisite

to establishing the constitutionality of state action.155 To the extent that the rational basis test has served any significant function in constitutional law, it has been as an evidentiary device for
flushing out constitutionally impermissible motives or goals.
Viewed as an independent norm, the test is largely an illusion. Of
its own force the rational basis test invalidates no motives or
goals. If, for example, the government defends a segregation requirement as designed to serve the goal of subordinating blacks,
the measure would be unconstitutional not because it lacks a rational basis but rather because the goal is impermissible. The rational basis test purports to regulate only the relationship
between goals and means, such that a law or action the goal of
which is to produce effect A is theoretically invalid if "in fact" it
produces effect Not A.
In theory, this requirement implements an understandable
norm-namely, prohibiting the government from making "clear
mistakes" in the selection of means for accomplishing goals. However, there are two related practical problems with enforcing this
norm. The first is that the question whether a legislative or an
administrative body made a "clear mistake" inevitably turns upon
the standard for judicial review of these other branches' determinations of often fairly complex issues of social fact. Even assuming that the "goal" is known, whether a legislative or
administrative body made a "mistake" in its choice of means for
accomplishing that goal will usually be a matter of judgment. Suffice it to say, without an attempted argument, that the courts have
traditionally and rightly been quite deferential' 5 6 -hence the "any
conceivable basis in fact" standard.
The second problem is that the theoretical statement of the
norm overlooks the epistemological or evidentiary interdependencies between effects and goals. An action's effect is usually very
probative evidence of its goals. In the absence of other reliable ev155. See note 150 supra. Of course, the rational basis requirement plays an important role in motivation analysis. This statement is the thrust of the argument in
the first half of this section. Perhaps future writings will succeed in explicating the

normative basis of an independent rationality requirement. See, e.g., Bice, Rationality in Constitutional Law (in process) (unpublished manuscript on file with
Prot Bice, University of Southern California Law Center). No intelligible explication has yet to be provided.
156. See authorities cited in notes 150-51 supra.
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idence, the effect will be the only evidence of goals, and even
when other evidence is available, the effect remains probative. To
revert to the statement of the norm, if effect Not A is the only evidence of the goal, we or a court would normally infer that the
goal was also Not A. If other evidence, like legislative history or a
representation of counsel, suggested that A was in fact the goal,
we would then be faced with a choice of inferences: Either the
legislature did not have sufficient wit to accomplish that which it
sought, or the legislative history or counsel's representation is
misleading. In choosing between these two inferences, we face an
irony: If the mistake in selecting means really was obvious, it
often becomes unbelievable that the legislature would have made
it, while if the mistake was less obvious, whether a court may
properly overturn the legislative judgment is unclear. In sum, as
the mistake becomes more obvious, and thus judicial intervention
more justifiable, the appropriate inference also becomes more obvious-namely, that this other evidence of the goal is misleading-perhaps, for example, that the legislative history is
incomplete, that counsel is mistaken, or that one or the other was
simply "hiding something." Because that "something" will often
be a constitutionally impermissible goal, "rationality" analysis
can play an evidentiary role in flushing out real motivation; but
the unconstitutionality of such a legislative or administrative action is accounted for by the various norms prohibiting the government from pursuing certain goals-including that barring racial
prejudice-not by the clear mistake norm.
In order to transform the rational basis requirement into a
meaningful, independent norm, one must arrive at an explanation
of why inferring goals from effects is sometimes constitutionally
unacceptable. Perhaps the best-known attempt at such an explanation is Professor Ely's. He suggests that in order to be acceptable, an alleged goal must be one about which a "consensus" exists
that it is the sort of goal generally served by laws of the type at
issue.1 57 Thus, Ely explains why the exemption of certain seafood
and agricultural trucks from a law requiring commercial carriers
to post security against liability for injuries caused by their negligence was "irrational," notwithstanding the fact that it produced
the effect and therefore was rationally related to the goal of subsidizing the favored industries: The law was a motor-vehicle regulation of the sort about which a consensus exists that it must serve
"traffic safety" goals, and the challenged distinction was not rationally related to any such goal.158
157. Motivation, supra note 1, at 1224-28.
158. Id., at 1225-26.
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Although Professor Ely's explanation is unacceptable to me, it
does contain an important insight. It is unacceptable because
there seems no basis whatever in the Constitution to suppose
that a legislature is prohibited from pursuing both economic and
traffic safety goals in its motor-vehicle code, or indeed, both traffic safety and economic goals in its taxing and spending programs. The insight nonetheless remains: A "consensus" of sorts
exists about which kinds of goals different governmental actions
usually serve. This point is important not, as Professor Ely
thought, for normative reasons, but rather for evidentiary ones.
The plausibility of a racially innocent explanation of a law or
other governmental action that produces significant racially disproportionate effects depends upon the extent to which the explanation corresponds to what we know from experience about the
way in which things happen or are done in our society. Explanations that, given the action and its effects, are "contextually peculiar" in the light of this experience should be treated with
extreme skepticism by the courts.159 Existing racial equal protection case law suggests that the courts basically understand the
suspiciousness of contextually peculiar explanations, but less
clear is whether they understand how this phenomenon relates to
so-called rationality analysis, and it is correspondingly unclear
whether they understand all the implications of contextual peculiarity.
To put the matter briefly, among the many things that we know
from experience are the ways in which government institutions
normally behave. In the face of evidence of significant racially disproportionate effects, an explanation that would require us to believe that an institution behaved quite differently from its usual
way is a contextually peculiar explanation and should be treated
skeptically. Some of the things we know about the normal behavior of government entities can be of evidentiary significance in racial equal protection suits, for example, that both legislative and
administrative institutions generally follow their own rules or customary practices. Further, both types of institutions normally pursue certain kinds of goals through certain kinds of means.
Administrative bodies also usually act on the basis of considerations that are within the scope of their delegated authority and
159. Professor Ely's rich discussion has stimulated many of the ideas about contextual peculiarity in this article. Id., at 1230-49.

1115

over time behave relatively consistently. The point is not that institutional behaviors that deviate from these normal patterns are
irrational and that a deviation itself is unconstitutional, but rather
that such deviations are relevant and sometimes very probative
evidence that actions producing disproportionate racial effects
were motivated by racial prejudice.
The courts have been perhaps most willing to infer prejudiced
motivation from disproportionate impact plus contextually peculiar claims of innocent motivation in cases involving jury selection. A showing that juries in a locality have historically included
a significantly lower proportion of blacks than does the juror pool
for all practical purposes spells unconstitutionality, notwithstanding a government explanation that selection from the pool was
random.160 Of course, chance possibly explains the disproportion,
but this outcome would be quite peculiar, just as it is possible but
peculiar that a flipped coin would turn up heads significantly
more times than tails when flipped often enough.
The timing of an action that produces a racially disproportionate effect may also sometimes preclude the government from explaining the action in any but a contextually peculiar way. The
racially gerrymandered boundary struck down by the Supreme
Court in Gomillion v. Lightfoot'6 ' is an example. The mere fact
that boundaries divide communities of different racial mixtures is
not itself unconstitutional, and because political boundaries often
are drawn piecemeal over time and for a wide variety of nonrational but racially innocent reasons, a governmental defendant will
usually be able to provide a credible non-racial explanation for
why the boundary is where it is. However, none of these usual
explanations were available to explain the Gomillion statute that
altered "the shape of Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure,"162 and any attempt by the government
to fabricate a non-racial explanation would have been so contextually peculiar as to be unbelievable.

160. The cases are legion. Among the Court's recent discussions are Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-33
(1972). Perhaps the Court's most open acknowledgement came in Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954):
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain
class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period. But
it taxes our credulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no
members of this class among the over six thousand jurors called in the
past 25 years.
Id. at 482.
161. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
162. Id. at 340.
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The realization that contextually peculiar goverpnent behavior
will be regarded as suspicious probably plays at least an implicit
role in cases involving historical patterns of administrative action
that have over time produced significantly disproportionate racial
effects. Yick Wo v. Hopkins'6 3 is the classic illustration of disproportionate impact in this context. In this case the Oriental plaintiff challenged the denial of his laundry license application, showing that the licensing board had over several years denied virtu-

ally all applications by Orientals and virtually none by whites.
The government did not even attempt a non-racial explanation.
In theory at least, in a case like Yick Wo, the government could
try to explain the disproportion on the basis that the agency each

week or day over, say, a five-year period changed its licensing policies back, forth, and sideways for reasons unrelated to race, such
that each of the apparently racially based denials could be correlated with an alleged non-racial policy shift. One reason that state
governmental defendants do not often attempt such explanations
is probably that the requisite non-racial explanations could not be
made without claiming that the agency took into consideration

policy matters that, though allegedly non-racial, were beyond the
scope of its state-delegated authority. 6 4 Another reason that such
explanations are not often attempted is probably that counsel realizes that an ekplanation predicated on weekly or daily policy
shifts-even if within the agency's lawful authority-would be re163. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
164. For example, there is substantial reason to suspect that a similar problem
played an important role in the famous case of Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), though obviously not in a racial discrimination context.
In the New York state courts, Railway Express had challenged the regulation
prohibiting advertising for hire on trucks, alleging the regulation was beyond the
authority of the police commissioner who promulgated it. The. opinion of the New
York Court of Special Sessions clearly shows that in order to survive this state
law challenge, the regulation had to be found to bear "a reasonable relationship to
the subject of traffic control and public safety." 188 Misc. 342, 346, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732,
736 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1947). Similarly, the three dissents from the judgment of the
New York Court of Appeals sustaining the regulation dissented on the ground that
it "is so entirely unrelated to traffic control as to be arbitrary as a matter of law."
297 N.Y. 703, 705, 77 N.E.2d 13, 13 (1947). In other words, if Railway Express had
argued in the state courts, as Justice Jackson was later to suggest in his concurring opinion in the United States Supreme Court, that the purpose of distinguishing between advertising for self and for hire was, in effect, to promote or subsidize
self-advertisers, there is a substantial probability that the classification would
have been found beyond the authority of the police commissioner. Having avoided
this argument in the state courts, counsel for Railway Express were presumably,
at a minimum, somewhat reluctant to make it in the Supreme Court.
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garded as extremely peculiar and therefore suspicious. Needless
to say, were the government to attempt a racially innocent explanation based on policies beyond the authority of the institution at
issue, or on some claimed bizarre manner of proceeding, the
courts should be extremely skeptical-the more so the greater
the racially disproportionate effect sought to be explained away.
Such explanations would not always be unbelievable for federal
racial equal protection purposes, but the courts should insist
upon clear and convincing proof that the claimed peculiar practice rather than racial prejudice really prompted the action.
Because the scope of an institution's authority is evidentially
relevant in appraising the credibility of allegedly innocent reasons- for actions producing racially disproportionate effects, the
probability that a plaintiff will be able to establish prejudiced motivation successfully is to some extent dependent upon the particular institution he is challenging. Generally speaking,
administrative actions will be easier to challenge than legislative
ones, and those of narrowly rule-bound agencies easier than those
of agencies with far-ranging discretion. This phenomenon, familiar to students of equal protection litigation,165 is explainable not
because legislatures are in any sense immune from the motivation inquiry but because their greater range of discretion produces more complicated evidentiary consequences. Of course, the
concept of contextual peculiarity is not irrelevant to legislative
actions; rather, the difference is only that proof problems in connection with legislation will sometimes be more complex.
To take a stark example, consider an employment rule promulgated by a police board requiring police applicants to pass a test
about opera or world history. Assume that the test, like the one in
Washington, disqualifies blacks at four times the rate of whites.
The board might try to dispel the inference of prejudiced motivation in either of two ways: First, it might claim that the test's goal
is to encourage the population to appreciate or learn opera or
world history by holding out public employment as a reward for
such knowledge; second, it might argue that its goal is a better police force, in that well-rounded police officers are likely to be
more understanding, to improve morale among their comrades,
and to present a more positive image to the public.
The first or "general education" explanation is simply beyond
the police board's authority, for it is neither a legislature nor a
board of education. If the police board is a federal one, a federal
court should invalidate the test on this ground without reaching
165. See Motivation, supra note 1, at 1284-89.
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the equal protection issue. If it is a state board, this contextually
peculiar explanation should carry little if any probative force on
the question of prejudiced motivation.
The second explanation is presumably within the scope of the
board's authority, but it is nonetheless contextually peculiar.
Neither opera nor world history knowledge is ordinarily regarded
as relevant or prerequisite to police work. To avoid an inference
that racial prejudice caused either the test's adoption, continued
use, or both, the government should be required to provide clear
and convincing proof that either general education or hiring "better" police officers is the test's real purpose, as for example, evidence clearly and unambiguously showing the conditions that led
to its adoption and continued use and/or empirical evidence establishing a reliable factual basis for both the board's conception
of who is a good police officer and the test's predictive value to
this end. Such proof should be required, not because the test is
"irrational," but because the innocent explanation alone is too peculiar to dispel an inference of prejudice. If the test produces no
significant racially disproportionate or other suspicious effects,
the police board's decision on who are and how to test for good
police officers ought to be, I believe, of no constitutional concern.
Peculiarity, indeed bizarreness, implicating no identifiable constitutional value, is both a benefit and cost of decentralized government operating under a separation of powers, and the federal
courts have no monopoly on wisdom.
Now, suppose that the same test, producing the same racially
disproportionate effect, were required by a state legislature. Legislative bodies obviously have much greater discretion under
state law to pursue wide-ranging goals than do administrative
agencies, and assuming no aberrant state constitutional restriction, both the general education goal of encouraging people to
learn opera or world history and the specification of the characteristics of good police officers are goals well within state legislative power. Because the legislature has the authority to pursue
both ends, it is marginally more believable that the first might in
fact have been the test's actual goal. In this sense the evidentiary
issues may be somewhat more complex, and the plaintiff faces a
marginally greater difficulty in proving his case.
Nonetheless, both goals remain contextually peculiar-the good
police officer for precisely the same reasons as with the police
board example and the general education goal because such ends
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are not usually pursued through employment regulation. To dispel the presumption of prejudice created by the disproportionate
impact, the government should have to make the same sort of
clear and convincing showing that either or both of the goals are
the real reason for the test's adoption and continued use.
Just as an action's contextual peculiarity is to some extent dependent on the particular institution challenged, it is also dependent-perhaps even more so-on the type of law or action at
issue. The reason is that experience indicates governments generally pursue a wider variety of goals through some types of actions
than through others. The wider the variety usually pursued, the
less likely that a claim of innocent motivation will be contextually
peculiar, and therefore, the more difficult will be a plaintiff's task
in attacking the action as racially prejudiced.
Perhaps the best examples are taxing and spending programs.
One of the reasons that such programs are relatively immune
from federal constitutional attack is that we are so accustomed to
their use to achieve a wide variety of goals that few if any goal
claims are contextually peculiar. Thus, a subsidy for opera performances, though it might well disproportionately advantage
whites relative to blacks, would be virtually impossible to attack
successfully on racial equal protection grounds without additional
evidence of motivation. The goal of subsidizing opera is simply to
promote the general welfare by encouraging activities that the
legislature believes valuable, and there is nothing peculiar or suspicious about such a goal.
Although taxing and spending programs are perhaps the clearest examples of actions from which inferences of a goal's contextual peculiarity are unlikely, the greatest limitation on the utility
of this kind of evidence arises from the obvious fact that many
goal claims in connection with numerous different kinds of action
will simply not be implausible on the surface. However, with regard to actions that produce significant racially disproportionate
effects, a plaintiff should sometimes be able to discredit a
nonpeculiar, innocent goal claim by proving that the goal could
have been accomplished through reasonably available alternative
means that would have produced a significantly less disproportionate effect.
The probative value of this kind of evidence on prejudiced motivation, as we discussed in connection with benign classifications,
is dependent on the extent to which such means would produce
costs or policy tradeoffs that were not entailed by the means actually used, for failure to employ alternatives can be based on the
legitimate desire to avoid goal frustration, increased costs, or un1120
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wanted policy effects. However, the question whether an apparent alternative means was reasonably available in this sense
cannot usually be answered as if it were a problem in mathematics. In cases in which the plaintiff has first proved that the action
produces a clear and significant segregation of or disadvantage to
a minority racial group and then produces further evidence sufficient to warrant an inference that the innocent goals the government claims for the action could be accomplished through
reasonably available alternative means, the government should
be obliged to supply a credible explanation, supported by evidence when indicated, about why this alternative was not employed.
Proof of a substantial disproportionate effect combined with evidence that an action's claimed innocent goal could reasonably
have been or could now be accomplished by means producing
less racial disadvantage to this minority group warrants an inference that the action would not have been taken or continued but
for racial prejudice. This is not to say that such evidence necessarily indicates that the action was taken or continued "for the
goal" of, say, segregating or disadvantaging blacks. We have noted
earlier that prejudice affects actions in ways other than as a conscious goal: It can also skew decisionmakers' perceptions and
evaluations of that which they consciously perceived as non-racial
costs and benefits. Evidence that such goals could as well have
been pursued in less racially hurtful ways with no significant sacrifice or added costs suggests at the least that prejudice may have
played or be playing such a skewing role.
Proof of this sort might be thought inadequate to support a
finding of prejudiced motivation without some independent evidence suggesting that the institution that took the action had
knowledge of the disproportionate impact that it would produce
and of the availability of the alternatives. Without debating the
extent to which it is generally fair to assume that institutions
have this kind of knowledge-at least in recent years many probably do-the institution will learn these facts, at the latest, when
brought into court by a plaintiff, and its subsequent refusal to
change or modify the challenged action is itself an equal protection violation if motivated by racial prejudice (though, of course,
the time of violation may affect the remedy that the plaintiff is
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seeking) .166
Although evidence of reasonably available alternatives can
sometimes be successfully deployed to prove prejudiced motivation, such evidence is of relatively little use with respect to governmental actions that are customarily used to achieve a wide
variety of goals. In other words, the usefulness of this sort of evidence is subject to the same general constraints as is evidence of
contextual peculiarity, and for this reason it will usually not be
helpful in attacks on taxing, spending, and many regulatory programs.
Consider, for example, a government decision to terminate a
particular spending program or to spend funds in one way rather
than another. Although decisions like these may disadvantage
blacks relative to whites, they are often made for non-racial, fiscal
and/or very specific general welfare goals. A program may be
discontinued simply to lower taxes or because the legislature
believes that the general welfare would be better served by subsidizing opera rather than by adding an increment to the mass
transit system. Similarly, raising the sales tax or requiring that
automobile manufacturers install emission control devices may
disproportionately disadvantage lower-income people and therefore blacks relative to whites. However, such decisions often reflect complex non-racial goal compromises that are not
contextually peculiar. Because innocent goals like these are not
contextually peculiar for these kinds of governmental actions, the
government will offer them in explanation of the disproportionate
impact, and it will be virtually impossible to prove that fiscal, specific general welfare, or compromise goals could be as well served
by alternative means without added costs or unwanted effects.
Evidence of reasonably available alternatives is most useful in
proving motivation when, because of the kind of institution and
action at issue, the challenged action may only plausibly be
claimed to have a limited number of relatively narrow goals. As a
practical matter, the suspiciousness of contextually peculiar
claims of innocent motivation operates in tandem with less restrictive alternative evidence to give rise to an inference of racially prejudiced motivation.
Local school board decisions on locating attendance zone lines,
placing new schools, or designating busing routes are examples of
governmental actions that can sometimes be shown to have been
166. Plaintiff would not be entitled to money damages, for example, unless he
proved the past action he challenges was racially prejudiced. See the discussion of
state action, note 34 supra. For a discussion of Washington v. Davis, see notes 17374 and accompanying text infra.
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affected by racial prejudice by means of evidence of disproportionate segregatory effect plus the availability of reasonable alternative means.1 67 Thus, a claim that one or several of these
decisions were taken in furtherance of a neighborhood school policy should be disbelieved if the plaintiff can prove that approximately the same school populations, walking distances, and
safety and transportation costs could have been accomplished
through alternative attendance zones, school locations, and bussing routes and that these alternatives would have significantly
reduced racial segregation. Moreover, even if the plaintiff could
not show that all these objectives could have been substantially
accomplished through less segregatory alternatives without additional cost, evidence of the contextual peculiarity of one or more
of the claimed innocent goals might permit the court to infer racial prejudice. If one or all of several allegedly innocent goals are,
for example, beyond the scope of the school board's authority, or
not the kinds of goals usually pursued by the methods employed,
or fairly clearly inconsistent with the school board's historical
practices or with conditions currently existing in other parts of
68
the district, a court should treat the defense skeptically.1 Suppose, for instance, that an alternative arrangement is available
that would substantially satisfy all the school board's alleged
goals without added costs, except that some students would have
to walk a somewhat greater distance than the board claims is consistent with district policy. A showing that in other parts of the
district, not realistically distinguishable from the area at issue,
students are currently walking the greater distance should, absent some credible non-racial explanation by the defendant, lead
a court to disbelieve the claimed walking distance goal and to infer racially prejudiced motivation from the disproportionate impact and reasonably available alternatives.
167. Many lower courts appear to rely on such evidence in school desegregation
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 389 (5th Cir.),
vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). For a collection of other cases in which less restrictive alternative evidence played a role, see Note, Reading The Mind of the
School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE
L.J. 317, 338 n.95 (1976).
168. Contextual peculiarity has occasionally been relied upon by courts in
school desegregation cases. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 543
n.28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975) (inference of segregative intent
arises from use of freedom of choice plan in one area and neighborhood school

policy in another).

1123

It is worth emphasizing that a racially prejudiced school board's
refusal to modify existing arrangements is as unconstitutional as
is the original racially prejudiced promulgation of the arrangement.169 Racial prejudice may have played no role whatever in
the board's drawing attendance zones, for example, but a refusal
to modify the zones in ways that would reduce segregation and
nevertheless substantially accomplish all the board's non-racial
and non-contextually peculiar goals should be found to be a product of racial prejudice. Evidence of a refusal to modify existing
bus routes or to relieve demonstrable overcrowding at a school by
moving students in ways reducing segregation should, in appropriate circumstances, lead to the same'finding.
We should also emphasize that a difference exists between
proof that reasonably alternative ways of accomplishing innocent
goals were or are available and a bald claim by the plaintiff that
there "must be some other way" to accomplish them. The latter
simply has no probative value on past or present motivation.
Moreover, even if joined with evidence that the means in use actually do not accomplish very well their stated goals, such a claim
is not the probative equivalent of proof of reasonably available alternative means, and such evidence alone will often not be sufficient to warrant an inference that the disproportionate impact is a
result of prejudice. Proof that a means does not very well accomplish its goals may indicate only that achieving the goals is difficult, and indeed in some cases the plaintiff's failure to produce
evidence of alternatives may itself reflect the fact that no better
means are known.
The imperfection of means is perhaps most endemic in connection with governmental actions the point of which is to predict the
future behavior of individuals: Who will commit repeated crimes?
Who will perform well in school or college? Who will be a good (or
competent) lawyer, teacher, or police officer? The means we currently use for making these judgments are notoriously imperfect,
but in many cases they are the best or as good as any known alternatives for accomplishing the goals for which such predictions
are sought. Of course, the implicit goals are often either vague or
a matter for legitimate dispute (What are the characteristics of a
good lawyer?), but these matters are not of constitutional concern
unless the goal choice was itself caused by prejudice or is offensive to some constitutional value; and proof that means imperfectly serve these goals, when no better means are known, does
not ordinarily warrant an inference of prejudice.
169. See note 34 supra.
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This observation is not meant to suggest that such evidence has
no value in extreme cases or that it cannot be useful when other
evidence of prejudice exists, or even that evidence of a government entity's unwillingness to investigate whether alternative
means may be available is always irrelevant to the question of
prejudiced motivation. Quite the contrary, evidence that a means
does not serve a goal significantly better than random choice establishes a reasonably available alternative and is very probative
of prejudice. Proof of less imperfect means could well tip the
scales if the plaintiff has produced other evidence of prejudice, as,
for example, evidence of social context or legislative history. Evidence of significant disproportionate impact, very imperfect
means, and a government refusal even to investigate the availability of alternatives would at least call for a credible explanation of
the refusal, such as, for example, that others had unsuccessfully
made such an investigation.
Moreover, in cases in which a major part of the responsibility of
the government agency that took the challenged action includes
continually assessing goals, means, and demographic data, arguably a showing of significant racially disproportionate impact
should itself shift to the government the burden of establishing
the absence of reasonable alternatives. Local school boards provide the prototypical example of this type of government institution. Perhaps such a shift in this burden is what Justice Powell
had in mind when he suggested in his concurrence in Keyes v.
School District No. 1170 that school districts are constitutionally
obliged to "implement their customary decisions with a view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities,"171 and what
moved the California Supreme Court to interpret the state's equal
protection clause to require school boards to take "reasonably
72
feasible" steps to reduce racial imbalance.1
A major part of a school district's responsibility includes the
continual processing of demographic data bearing on likely population movement, and school authorities, as managers of an ongoing enterprise, constantly make short- and long-run means and
goal choices having reciprocal ,effects on one another. A decision
to buy land at one time affects the relative cost and hence the fu170. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
171. Id. at 226 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 305-06, 551 P.2d 28, 45, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 741 (1976).
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ture reasonableness of building schools at these or different locations-a fact that in turn affects the location of attendance zones
designed to promote neighborhood schools and may indeed affect
the choice of whether to strive for neighborhood schools at all,
and so on. Because the school authorities' business is to make
these choices in the context of information about demographic
patterns, they are obviously in the best position to know which
combination of choices will likely result in the least segregation
consistent with other goals, and they can hardly claim that they
were unaware of either the racial effects of their actions or alternative ways of pursuing non-racial goals. Correspondingly, it may
be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove that any one choice
or set of choices was affected by racial prejudice, given that the
reasonableness of alternatives is to some extent itself a function
of previous sets of choices. At the same time, it may well be that
the entire ongoing management was skewed by racial prejudice,
and the historical practices of many school boards support this
possibility. For these reasons, a common sense basis exists for
the notion of imposing a prospective continuing obligation on
school authorities of the sort outlined by Justice Powell and the
California Supreme Court, and of imposing on these authorities
the burden of establishing that their ongoing pattern of choices
was taken with a view toward minimizing segregation consistently with other goals.
Most governmental actions do not share these special characteristics. The choice of an employment qualification system, for
example, is not integrally related to demographic patterns and
does not necessarily involve any interlocking set of reciprocally
related choices, and the question of reasonable alternatives does
not require either analysis of a maze of interrelated and detailed
decisions or access to information not reasonably available or understandable to the plaintiff. Consider Washington v. Davis.173
The government's claim that the civil service reading comprehension test was adopted to help select those who would do well in
the training program and make good police officers was not contextually peculiar. Common sense suggests that reading ability
probably has something to do with trainability and with success
on the job, and using such a test to screen potential employees is
not unusual. Consequently, the government's explanation was
sufficiently credible to offset the inference of prejudiced motivation from the proven disproportionate effect.
If in such a case the plaintiff comes forward with evidence suggesting that the test produces no better police officers than does
173. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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random choice, or that there are other reasonably available ways
of screening for good officers, an inference of prejudice in the
test's adoption or past use would still not be warranted, for, absent evidence that the police board had knowledge of these facts,
the assumption remains credible that it made the common sense
judgment that reading comprehension is related to trainability
and job success. If, as in Washington, the plaintiff is seeking a
remedy based on an alleged past violation, she will therefore lose.
However, evidence of available alternatives should shift to the
government the burden of proving that a failure to change the
test, now that it has this information, is explainable on some
ground other than racial prejudice, as, for example, the unreliability of plaintiff's data, the significant goal frustration, or the added
costs that the alleged alternative would entail.174
Some Concluding Observationson Causation
The Supreme Court's decision in Mount Healthy City School
District v. Doyle 7 5 makes clear that in order to grant a plaintiff
relief on the basis of a claim that governmental action was motivated by constitutionally impermissible considerations, a court
must be persuaded that the government entity would not have
reached the same decision but for the impermissible consideration. As stated by the Doyle Court, once the plaintiff has borne
the burden of proving that the impermissible consideration was a
'isubstantial" or '"motivating" factor, the government must prove
"by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision as to respondent's re-employment even in the
absence of the protected conduct." 7 6 The Court has indicated
that the same approach is applicable in racial equal protection
suits, 7 7 and this issue deserves brief but necessarily incomplete
attention here.
Whether any independent "causation" issue will exist in the
case depends on the kind of evidence from which the court infers
that racial prejudice affected the action. When this inference is
174. In Washington itself, of course, there appeared to be no claim that the police department was unconcerned about the current plight of black applicants, for
the department had, since 1969, engaged in an affirmative program to recruit
blacks and hire those passing the test. Id. at 235, 246.
175. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
176. Id. at 287.
177. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252

(1977).
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based upon the probative value of the challenged rule or action
itself, as in the case of racially overt rules, or upon evidence of
significant disproportionate effects in combination with circumstantial disproof of all the government's innocent goal claims, no
separable causation issue will arise. In cases in which the inference of prejudiced motivation is based upon evidence showing
that racial considerations were among those taken into account in
the decision process, or upon circumstantial disproof of some but
not all the government's innocent goal claims, a separate causation issue will exist, and the important questions involve the
kinds of government evidence that should be sufficient to dispel
the inference of prejudice.
In cases involving challenges to racially overt rules, the questions whether racial prejudice affected the decision process at all,
and if so, whether the action would have been taken but for this
prejudice, usually merge. A rule or action that is symptomatic of
prejudice or that singles out a racial group for clear disadvantage
creates a strong presumption, for reasons that we have discussed,
both that prejudice played a role in the process and that this role
was causal. In order to disprove either of these presumptions, the
government must meet the necessary to a compelling goal standard. Similarly, determining whether a facially benign racially
overt rule would have been enacted but for racial prejudice will
ordinarily present no separable causation question, except for
subgroup prejudice claims that, as we have noted, are really a
species of covert discrimination attack. Generally the fact will be
clear and admitted that the action would not have been taken but
for racial considerations, and the question is whether these considerations were benign or prejudiced.
Covert discrimination claims are more complex. In connection
with our discussion of the kinds of evidence usually available to
prove that racial prejudice affected an action, we observed that
some kinds of evidence function to create inferences that discredit innocent goal claims and others to create inferences that
prejudice was among the considerations in the decision process. 7 8 In the preceding section of this article, we examined at
length two kinds of evidence that discredit innocent goal
claims-the contextual peculiarity of claimed goals and the availability of reasonable alternatives.
An inference of contextual peculiarity may arise either as a
matter of judicial notice or on the basis of plaintiff's evidence and
may consist of any of several different types of information that
178. See notes 115-27 and accompanying text supra.
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suggest the government's innocent goal claim is so contextually
peculiar as to warrant disbelief, for example, that the claimed goal
is not usually pursued through actions of the type at issue, that it
is beyond the delegated authority of the challenged institution, or
that it is inconsistent with the institution's historical policies or
practices.l? 9 Our point was to demonstrate that evidence of this
sort or of reasonably available alternative means can sometimes,
in conjunction with proof of significant disproportionate impact,
support a finding of prejudiced motivation. The reason for this
conclusion is that such evidence disproves the government's innocent goal claims and thus leaves unrebutted the inference of
prejudiced motivation that arises from disproportionate impact.
In cases in which the plaintiff relies on evidentiary inferences of
this sort, no separate causation question will arise. If the government has supplied no credible, nonprejudiced explanation of the
action, the appropriate inference is simply that the action was
taken, or at least continued in force, because of racial prejudice.
Causation arises as an independent question when the plaintiff,
in addition to disproportionate impact, relies only on evidence
that functions to create an inference that prejudice was among
the considerations taken into account. Evidence of this sort includes, for example, assigning a racially prejudiced reason as one
basis of an administrative or judicial decision, omitting some required or customary procedure in the decision process, proving
that the action was taken in a racially prejudiced social-political
context, or providing evidence of prejudice in the institution's information-gathering or deliberative process. These and similar
kinds of evidence create inferences that racial prejudice played
some role in the decision process, but they do not disprove that
innocent goals also played some role. The important question,
therefore, is whether the action would have been taken but for
the effects of prejudice.
Thus whether a separate causation question exists is, like all
the other problems we have considered, a function of the evidence upon which the plaintiff relies. If a government agency discharges a black employee for the alleged reason that he was late
for work several times, the employee, in order to prove an equal
protection violation, might rely on circumstantial evidence suggesting that white employees who were similarly tardy were
179. See notes 157-66 and accompanying text supra.
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never fired, but that blacks always were, even when they were not
tardy. Successful proof by the plaintiff simultaneously establishes
that prejudice played a role in his firing and that it played a
causal role. If, instead, the government agency fires the employee
for the stated reason that he is black and was tardy, the plaintiff
need only establish this fact, and, under Mount Healthy and Arlington Heights, the burden shifts to the government to prove he
would have been fired only for being tardy.
The important question is what sort of governmental evidence
should discharge this burden, given varying configurations of disproportionate impact, varying kinds of evidence that prejudice affected the decision process, and varying types of governmental
actions and innocent goal claims. This subject is beyond the scope
of this already overly long article, but the moral of this story is
consistent with that of the larger one: The importantquestions are
all evidentiary.
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